After Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Bellona ceased its activity in the aggressor country. On 18 April 2023, the Russian general prosecutor’s office declared Bellona to be an undesirable organization.

However, we continue to monitor events in the field of nuclear and radiation safety relating to Russia and Ukraine, which we believe are of interest to foreign readers. We analyze the situation in order to assess the degree of Russia’s international influence on other countries and the risks connected with this. We present you with a survey of these events for October 2024 with comments by Alexander Nikitin and Dmitry Gorchakov, experts of Bellona’s nuclear project.

Follow the links to read the last three digests for September, August and July . Subscribe to our mailing list to make sure you don’t miss the next digest.

In this issue:

NUCLEAR EVENTS IN UKRAINE AND THE WAR
1. The Zaporizhzhia NPP and other nuclear facilities in Ukraine. Event timeline for October 2024

INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR EVENTS AND THEIR CONNECTION WITH RUSSIA
2. Decision to build NPP in Kazakhstan approved in referendum
3. Framatome signs contract to deliver fuel for Paks NPP in Hungary
4. USA imposes sanctions on several more Rosatom subsidiaries
5. Urenco and Orano start realization of projects to expand enrichment facilities
6. US Department of Energy signs contracts for local manufacture of HALEU

EVENTS IN THE RUSSIAN NULEAR SECTOR AND IN ROSATOM PROJECTS ABROAD
7. BRICS+ countries to create Nuclear Platform
8. Rosatom’s projects abroad in brief

SEPARATE EXTENDED COMMENTARY ON A SIGNIFICANT EVENT OF THE MONTH
9. Rosatom head reports to Russian president on state work results

Nuclear events in Ukraine and the war

The Zaporizhzhia NPP and other nuclear facilities in Ukraine. Event timeline for October 2024 ↑

Military threats. The Zaporizhzhia NPP

On 1 October the 330 kV power line was once again disconnected, which is used at the plant as a backup line. The plant received electricity from its sole remaining 750 kV line. Ukraine reported that the disconnection took place as the result of a Russian attack on the main substation, and that Ukrainian power engineers were working to eliminate the consequences in order to restore the backup power supply. The power line was reconnected on 3 October.

Additionally, on 30 September another power line nearby was damaged connecting the plant with the 150 kV open switchyard of the Zaporizhzhia Thermal Power Plant, damage to which limits the possibility for backup power supply of the ZNPP. The connection to this line was restored over the following few days.

On 21 October, the 330 kV back-up power line was once more disconnected for over 24 hours, and according to reports by the Russian side the cause of the damage was unknown, but it took place on the right side of the Dnipro River.  Energoatom reported that the disconnection from the Ukrainian power system took place as the result of Russian shelling.

On 4 October, a person was killed by a car bomb explosion in Enerhodar. Russia informed the IAEA that the person was “one of the key staff members responsible for ensuring nuclear security” and was “head of the permits bureau” at the ZNPP. Ukraine told the IAEA that he was not a ZNPP staff member anymore. In follow-up communication with the IAEA, Ukraine said it “does not attack civilians”. Ukraine did not confirm or deny any responsibility for the attack.

Ukrainian military intelligence published a statement that the person was involved in organizing and carrying out military crimes and repressions of Ukrainian under occupation, including ZNPP staff.

In response to these reports, IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi reiterated that one of the seven indispensable pillars for nuclear safety and security states that operating staff must be able to fulfill their safety and security duties and have the capacity to make decisions free of undue pressure, and that any targeting of employees of nuclear power plants violates this principle.

Grossi also once again called for maximum restraint during the conflict and said that any action targeting staff at the ZNPP – in order to address issues relating to its status – has a direct impact on nuclear safety and security and must cease.

Throughout the entire month, IAEA team members at the ZNPP continued to hear frequent explosions, including near the plant, but they did not receive reports about damage to the plant.

Staff situation at the ZNPP. In October, the IAEA mission team was informed by ZNPP representatives that there were now almost 5,000 employees at the plant, of whom 130 work at the training center, including 70 instructors, and that the goal is to expand the personnel to 6,000.

Technical state of the ZNPP. On 31 October the IAEA reported that in an impulse line (a small pipe, part of the reactor coolant pump support systems) connected to the primary circuit of unit 1, a small water leak had been detected, and repairs were being carried out. For this work, the reactor was put into cold shutdown for servicing, and pressure in the primary circuit was decreased to atmospheric level.

Grossi stated that although in the present state there were no immediate issues for nuclear safety, in general the agency had identified regular equipment maintenance, which is vital to ensure sustainable nuclear safety and security, as a challenging area for the occupied Zaporizhzhia NPP.

The reactor unit was returned to cold shutdown mode on 2 November after welding and radiography tests were completed. The plant continues to analyze the underlying cause of the defect.

Walkdowns of the ZNPP site and buildings by IAEA experts. On October, information about walkdowns carried out by the IAEA team at the ZNPP was quite sparse. The updates state that they were carried out regularly, and that the following were inspected:

Update 254 of 10 October:

– sprinkler ponds;

– turbine halls of two units (note by Bellona – it is not indicated which units these were, or whether the experts received access to the western parts or not);

– one of the main transformers (experts observed ongoing maintenance);

– one of the emergency diesel generators (experts observed testing).

Update 255 of 18 October

– pumping station of unit 4 (its circulation pump is used to maintain the flow of cooling water between the ZNPP discharge and intake channels. Its operation is dependent on the overall water level in the cooling pond, which is steadily decreasing);

– cooling tower 1 (the IAEA noted that no maintenance activities were being carried out at the cooling tower that was damaged by fire. ZNPP representatives reported that they plan to involve external contractors to assess the damage).

Update 256 of 24 October:

– unit 4 – emergency diesel generator.

Update 257 of 31 October:

– units 1 -6 – main control rooms of all six units (key parameters of the plant were checked);

– units 2 and 5 – some emergency diesel generators (their readiness and level of diesel fuel were checked).

In October, Russia’s permanent mission to the international organizations in Vienna ceased to send weekly reports to the IAEA on the “actual state of affairs” at the ZNPP, which described tens of Ukrainian drones shot down daily, “launched by Ukraine with the aim of attacks and provocations against ZNPP and Enerhodar”, social provision and training of staff, and also interaction with IAEA mission representatives at the ZNPP, in particular what experts examined during walkdowns of the plant site.

The last such report was published on 27 September, and the next did not appear until 15 November. It described that in the period from 27 September to 6 November, IAEA experts visited:

– reactor halls of units 1, 3-6;

– turbine halls of units 5 and 6;

– reserve diesel power plants of units 1-5;

– cooling towers at hydrotechnical structures;

– the express laboratories of the turbine hall of unit 2;

– special buildings 1 and 2;

– the chemical workshop in the combined auxiliary building;

– the dry storage facility for spent nuclear fuel;

– mobile pumping units, mobile diesel generators at the plant;

– the 750 kV open switchyard;

– auxiliary facilities block, electrical and mechanical equipment storage facilities;

– power unit 4 coastal pumping station;

– control rooms of units 1-6;

– sprinkler ponds.

Military threats. Attacks on critically important energy infrastructure of other nuclear power plants in Ukraine

At other Ukrainian NPPs – the Khmelnitsky, Rivne, South Ukraine and Chernobyl plants, air raid alarms were regularly heard, and several times the IAEA group present at the Khmelnitsky NPP took shelter.

Throughout the entire month, Ukraine reported to the IAEA that drones were frequently detected flying near operating NPPs, noting that by the end of October drone flights over protected zones of Ukrainian NPPs had become regular and daily, which directly violates the IAEA nuclear security and safety regulations and seriously threatens the operational stability and safety of these nuclear facilities.

Drones were not only detected near nuclear plants, but also directly above critically important infrastructural objects, including power units and switchyards providing electricity (see INFCIRC/1253, INFCIRC/1255, INFCIRC/1256, INFCIRC/1257).

In the period of 21-27 October, as part of the IAEA’s assessment of the state of Ukrainian power networks, IAEA representatives visited several Ukrenergo power substations at Ukraine’s request, which were determined to be critical to ensure the reliable functioning of Ukrainian nuclear plants. During these visits representatives assessed the operational consequences of actual and potential damages to substations which provide an external power supply to NPPs.

Commentary by Bellona:

«The situation at the ZNPP remains unchanged. The power units are in cold shutdown mode, the external power lines are disconnected periodically for war-related reasons, and causes mild agitation among the plant staff and IAEA mission members.

In the period under discussion, three events stood out:

Firstly, the process for maintaining systems and equipment important for ensuring nuclear safety of the ZNPP power units remains vague and uncontrolled. If even IAEA inspectors note this, the situation really is an unpleasant one. And if the decision is made to heat power units to bring them out of cold shutdown mode, all safety systems must undergo a full cycle of maintenance and checks. Otherwise, this may lead to nuclear incidents. The reason for the poor maintenance may be a lack of staff or spare parts for equipment. It is difficult to say what the size of the ZNPP staff is at present and what its professional level is. The figures provided by the Russians cannot be trusted.

The second important and alarming event was military attacks on critically important infrastructure of the four other NPPs in Ukraine. When the IAEA, coordinating with the Ukrainian leadership, took the decision for the periodic presence of its missions in places important for the normal functioning of Ukrainian NPPs, there was the hope that the mission would serve as an “umbrella” and thus help to keep the Ukrainian energy system in working condition as winter approaches. But the hopes proved unjustified, as Putin does not let any obstacles or authorities stand in the way of his aggressive plans.

The third event was the car bombing that killed the head of security at the ZNPP. According to Ukrainian reports, this individual had betrayed numerous disloyal former ZNPP employees to the Russian special services, leaving their fate unknown. As a result, he was deemed an enemy by Ukrainian special services, who took action to eliminate him.

What stands out is the unexpectedly strong reaction from the head of the IAEA to this incident. It seems puzzling that Grossi views the role of a head of security at a nuclear facility—operating under wartime conditions and constant shelling—as critical to nuclear safety. His response suggests that his statements to the press may have relied heavily on information provided by the Russian side, without fully grasping the circumstances or the individual involved. In assessing such incidents, it is essential to remember that this is not a time of peace but a war, where enemies are targeted and eliminated
»

International nuclear events and their connection with Russia

Decision to build NPP in Kazakhstan approved in referendum ↑

A referendum was held in Kazakhstan on 6 October on the construction of a nuclear power plant, where a majority voted in favor of the proposal.

Kazakhstan has been considering the possibility of building an NPP for several years. In 2019 technical and commercial proposals were examined from key world suppliers of nuclear technologies – six companies from five countries (South Korea, China, Russia, USA, France) which submitted 13 different options for reactors with varying capacity, components etc. After a consideration and study of the proposals a short list of four projects was drawn up.

The potential suppliers considered by the Kazakhstan government are China’s CNNC (HPR-1000 reactor), Russia’s Rosatom (VVER-1200 and VVER-1000 reactors), South Korea’s KHNP (APR-1400 reactor) and EDF from France (EPR1200 reactor). Initially the decision to choose a partner was scheduled to be made by the end of 2022, then in 2023 it was decided to first hold a national referendum on the construction, held in October.

Kazakhstan President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, replying to questions as to which of the above companies could receive a construction contract, announced that in his opinion an international consortium should build the NPP (it is as yet unclear what he means by a consortium).

Kazakhstan’s first deputy prime minister Roman Sklyar said that the consortium could include up to five countries. When asked by journalists whether it would include Russia, Sklyar said that Russia’s involvement would be examined taking into account sanction risks.

Sklyar added that the decision on creating the consortium and its membership would be passed in 2025. In the same year, it is planned to develop the necessary documentation, and choose contractors and designers. A year will be required to prepare the technical-economic justification, and 1.5 years for design and budget documentation. After these stages are completed, construction of the NPP may begin. It is planned to put two units into operation by 2035.

In mid-October, the Kazakhstan media reported that the Telegram channel of oil and gas sector analyst Oleg Chervinsky had published an alleged letter from the Russia embassy to the Kazakhstan Interior Ministry of 11 October, requesting a meeting between President Tokayev and Rosatom head Aleksey Likhachev “to discuss prospects of cooperation in the nuclear sphere”. Journalists sent a request to the ministry to confirm this document was genuine. The ministry replied that organizing the president’s schedule was not under its jurisdiction.

On 22-25 October a Kazakhstan delegation headed by energy minister Almasadam Satkaliev made an official visit to South Korea, where possible involvement of South Korean companies in the international consortium for building the NPP was discussed.

On 4-5 November, Tokayev made a state visit to France, where he met with President Emmanuel Macron, and also with the heads of Orano and EDF.

On 6-7 November Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov made an official visit to Kazakhstan. At a press conference after the meeting, Lavrov did not reply to the question where the issue of building the NPPS was discussed in talks, but said that Rosatom was prepared to provide its competencies, and also to cooperate with respective agencies and structures of other nations.

Commentary by Bellona:

«Many public organizations, including Bellona, take an interest in the events surrounding the planned construction of an NPP in Kazakhstan, and Bellon has recently published several articles on this topic: “Kazakhstan votes to build a nuclear plant”, “Kazakhstan responds coolly to Rosatom’s nuclear construction courtship.

The Kazakhstan nuclear plant that Russia, France, South Korea and China are competing to build, is not so much about a power facility as about Kazakhstan uranium supplies, in which France and Russia are primarily interested in today. The Russian interest also lies in its aspiration to put political pressure on Kazakhstan through Rosatom projects.

Under the previous Kazakhstan president Nursultan Nazarbayev, Rosatom was able to acquire various shares (from 30% to 70%) in Kazakhstan uranium fields. Today Russia’s goal is to make Kazakhstan dependent on it for nuclear power, and subsequently use this factor for its influence. So for Rosatom to lose this competition will be extremely undesirable and painful. Hence the constant efforts made by the higher leadership of Rosatom and the Russian Interior Ministry, attempting at all costs to stake out a place for Rosatom in the consortium at least, which perhaps will be created to build the NPP.

France, which stands to lose its uranium fields in Niger after the coup that took place there, is attempting to find a replacement for Nigerien uranium in Kazakhstan. Additionally, a great deal in this uranium deal will depend on China’s position, which is also interested in Kazakhstan uranium and is attempting to strengthen its position in Central Asia.
Thus, Kazakhstan’s decision will have geopolitical significance and show its political orientation for the near future»

Framatome signs contract to deliver fuel for Paks NPP in Hungary ↑

On 25 October the French nuclear fuel manufacturer Framatome and MVM Paks Nuclear Power Plant Ltd. announced the signing of a long-term contract to deliver fuel for the four VVER-440 reactors of the Paks NPP from 2027. The basis of this contract is a memorandum of understanding signed in September 2023.

In July Framatome signed a contract to deliver fuel for VVER-440 reactors in Slovakia.

In the short term, Framatome plans to manufacture fuel “identical to the proven design currently used in VVER reactors” under a license from Rosatom at its plant in Linden, Germany. For this purpose, a joint venture was established with Rosatom’s fuel company TVEL.

So far the modernization of the plant, which will allow it to manufacture hexagonal fuel assemblies, has not received a license. Russia’s involvement in the project is causing considerable concern in Germany. On November 20, public hearings will be held in Lingen to consider the objections (around 11,000) received by the Ministry of Environment, Energy, and Climate Protection of Lower Saxony.

Parallel to this, in the long-term perspective Framatome is developing and qualifying fuel of its own construction for VVER-400 and 1000 rectors.

We should also note that on 1 October Framatome signed a Memorandum of understanding with the Czech energy company ČEZ which manages the Dukovany and Temelin NPPs, concerning the program for developing fuel for VVER-1000 rectors.

Commentary by Bellona:

«Undoubtedly, in the current conditions of the war in Ukraine and the confrontation between Russia and the West, one can only welcome the efforts of Western countries to strengthen their energy security and reduce dependence on Russian supplies of nuclear fuel for VVER reactors. It is also telling and significant that a contract for the supply of alternative fuel has now been signed in Hungary, which remained the last of the five EU countries operating Soviet-designed VVER reactors that did not have such contracts.

It is also important to remember that Framatome does not yet have its own independently licensed fuel for VVER reactors. When the company speaks of “reliable and proven” fuel for VVER reactors in its press releases, it simply means fuel produced under a Russian license. Thus, the current fuel offers from Framatome cannot be called a complete break from ties with Russia.

According to the information available to us (from a Framatome presentation at the PWR Prague 2024 conference in October this year), Framatome plans to complete the development of its own independently licensed fuel for VVER-440 reactors only by 2028. Therefore, there is a high probability that the first deliveries, according to the signed contract for the Paks NPP, will still be Russian, if the company can resolve the issues related to launching the licensed production of this fuel in the EU.

Nevertheless, it is important to note Framatome’s efforts to create a purely European fuel for VVER reactors, as currently the only alternative to Russian fuel for such reactors is supplies from the North American company Westinghouse. For European consumers that have cancelled Russian supplies, it is important to have a choice of suppliers, and it is desirable to have at least one of them domestically. Therefore, one can understand the efforts of the European Commission in supporting Framatome’s developments and allocating funding for this under the Safe and Alternative VVER European Project
»

USA imposes sanctions on several more Rosatom subsidiaries ↑

On October 30, the United States imposed new sanctions on Russia. Primarily, these sanctions target entities in third countries to hinder efforts to circumvent previously imposed restrictions, and they also target Russian defense industry enterprises. The press release further states that the State Department “continues to target subsidiaries” of Rosatom that “are involved in Russia’s nuclear weapons complex and defense sector, nuclear power plant construction exports, development of advanced technologies and materials, mining industries and related enterprises, as well as in Rosatom’s malign activities, including the occupation of the Zaporizhzhia NPP in Ukraine”.

This time the sanctions lists includes three companies that develop digital and electronic technologies and new business sectors in the Rosatom sphere of influence:

– Rosatom Digital Solutions, which develops digital products and provides import substitution of specialized software;

– Smart City Digital Platforms and Solutions, a Rosatom subsidiary in the computer programming sphere;

– Rosatom Microelectronics, which develops a Russian electronic component base for Rosatom enterprises.

In 2024, the USA has already included Rosatom’s companies on its sanctions lists: in February, sanctions were imposed on Rosatom structures supporting the development of Russia’s Arctic region, future business development, and the Russian nuclear weapons complex (Rusatom Arktika, Innovation Hub, Alexandrov Research and Technology Institute). In May, sanctions were imposed on structures supplying machine tools to Rosatom (IPN Stankostroenie and JSK Russtan)

We may note that since April this year, bill H.R.8046 was been under review in US Congress concerning Rosatom, which if it is passed will:

– require the president to present a strategy to replace Rosatom and other nuclear suppliers of the Russian Federation with those from the United States and United States allies and partners;

 – impose sanctions on Rosatom, persons affiliated with it and its subsidiaries, foreign persons engaged in Rosatom construction of new reactors, and also on anyone who assists these persons and organizations to violate sanctions;

– allow the imposition of secondary sanctions on any foreign person participating in significant transactions with Rosatom.

Commentary by Bellona:

«The sanctions lists of the US and other countries are regularly updated to include Rosatom’s companies. However, all these companies have little to do with the state corporation’s main export activities (construction of nuclear power plants abroad, nuclear fuel cycle services), which bring in its main foreign revenue.

In these areas, the imposition of sanctions is stalling, and each country is deciding the matter independently, taking into account its own economic interests and existing dependencies.

However, it is the United States that has made the most significant progress in this direction by introducing a law prohibiting the purchase of Russian enriched uranium and incentivizing alternative suppliers (see the following sections)»

Urenco and Orano begin realization of projects for expanding enrichment facilities ↑

On 9 October, a ceremony was held at the enrichment facility of the international company Urenco in Eunice, New Mexico, USA, to mark the installation of the first new centrifuges in an existing centrifuge hall. This installation is part of an expansion project announced in July 2023, aimed at increasing the plant’s enrichment capacity by 15% (approximately 700,000 SWU per year) by 2027. Production of enriched uranium using the new centrifuges is scheduled to begin in 2025.

In 2023, Urenco USA’s annual production in Eunice was 4.4 million SWU. The company states that it has a license and the physical capabilities to expand its annual production to 10 million SWU.

In total, as part of the already launched expansion, Urenco plans to increase its enriched uranium production by 1.8 million SWU per year across its three projects, including two others at sites in Germany and the Netherlands

On 10 October, the French company Orano laid the foundation stone for an expansion project at its Georges Besse-2 enrichment plant, as announced in October 2023. With a projected investment of 1.7 billion euros, this project will enable Orano to increase its production capacity by more than 30% (2.5 million SWU per year). The expansion involves the construction of four additional modules, identical to the fourteen already in operation. They will utilize the same proven centrifuge technology but with a reduced environmental impact. The first production operations are expected to start in 2028, with full commissioning in 2030.

On 24 October Orano announced that the French state has fully subscribed to the newly issued shares of the company for a total amount of 300 million euros. This funding will be used in part to finance expansion of the Georges Besse-2 plant.

Commentary by Bellona:

«As the third year of war in Ukraine comes to an end, the western nuclear industry has begun to realize practical steps to change the market of the most critically important sectors of the industry that depend on Russia. Throughout these years, we at Bellona have said that these changes would not be swift, but would be inevitable.

Following government decisions and declarations about the need to strengthen energy security and reinforce supply chains in the nuclear fuel cycle, as well as legislative initiatives and financial guarantees, businesses have taken practical steps and are ready to invest in expanding their capacities in the face of guaranteed future demand.

As we wrote earlier, the declared expansion of capacities may allow the EU and USA to replace at least 60% of enriched uranium purchases by 2030, which are currently delivered to these markets from Russia»

US Department of Energy signs contracts for domestic production of HALEU ↑

On 8 October, the US Department of Energy announced that it had awarded contracts to six companies, allowing them to bid on providing services for the deconversion of high-assay low-enriched uranium (HALEU) – the stage in the fuel cycle that follows the enrichment of gaseous uranium hexafluoride, where uranium is converted into oxide or metallic forms from which fuel is then fabricated. (A request for proposals for deconversion services was issued in November 2023.)

The companies awarded contracts by the department were: BWXT, Centrus, France’s Framatome, GE Vernova, the US division of the French state company Orano, and Westinghouse.

All contracts will last up to 10 years, and each company will receive a contract worth at least $2 million. The total amount that can be allocated for deconversion services is up to $800 million, subject to appropriations. (For more information about these companies and their comments after the announced decision, follow this link.)

Subsequently, on 17 October the US Department of Energy announced that four contracts had been signed for providing uranium enrichment services for HALEU production. (The request for proposals for HALEU enrichment services was announced in January 2024.)

The companies chosen – Louisiana Energy Services (operator of the centrifugal enrichment plant of Urenco USA), Orano Federal Services (a division of Orano USA), General Matter, American Centrifuge Operating (a subsidiary of Centrus) will be able to take part in the tender for services for HALEU enrichment and storage in the form of gaseous uranium hexafluoride.

Centrus already produces HALEU for the US Department of Energy, Urenco USA has the country’s sole commercial enrichment plant in Eunice, New Mexico, and Orano plans to build a new centrifugal plant for uranium enrichment in Oak Ridge, Tennessee.

Like the deconversion contracts, these enrichment contracts will have a duration of up to 10 years, with a minimum value of $2 million each. The total amount that can be allocated for enrichment, subject to appropriations, is up to $2.7 billion.

The HALEU acquired under these contracts will be used for reactors such as TerraPower’s Natrium reactor and X-energy’s Xe-100, which are being developed as part of the U.S. Department of Energy’s Advanced Reactor Demonstration Program

Commentary by Bellona:

«Realizing the vulnerability of its position in the low-enriched uranium market, the U.S. is seeking to ensure the security of future HALEU fuel supplies for promising directions in nuclear energy development, such as fourth-generation reactors and small modular reactors (SMRs). Relying on Russia, which until recently was the sole commercial supplier of this fuel, is no longer considered safe or politically acceptable.

For Russia and Rosatom, the development of Western capabilities to produce HALEU could pose problems not only in the form of reduced demand for its products from the West but also in the form of increased competition in third-country markets in the future
»

Events in the Russian nuclear sector and in Rosatom projects abroad

BRICS+ countries to create nuclear platform ↑

On October 22-24, a BRICS summit took place in Kazan. BRICS now includes ten countries: Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa (the acronym BRICS is derived from the first letters of these countries’ names), as well as Egypt, Iran, the United Arab Emirates, and Ethiopia, which joined the alliance and led to the group being referred to as BRICS+.

A week prior to this, the heads of major companies and organizations of the nuclear sector held the first meeting to discuss creating the BRICS nuclear platform – a voluntary alliance of companies, professional nuclear groups and NCOs supporting the development and implementation of nuclear technologies.

The stated goal of the union is to develop and implement best practices and advanced approaches in the peaceful use of nuclear technologies for both energy and non-energy applications in the BRICS and BRICS+ markets, as well as to develop mechanisms and models that stimulate nuclear projects.

At the meeting the participants discussed the initiative and set out future plans.

At present, in addition to the 390 GW of operational NPP power units worldwide, another 66 GW of nuclear capacities are under construction. It is forecast that by 2030 at least two thirds of the growth in the number of NPPs worldwide will be provided by BRICS countries.

Commentary by Bellona:

«The attempt to coordinate nuclear cooperation within BRICS+ countries seems quite logical, as almost all the large countries in the union possess or plan to develop nuclear industries and energy. And Russia has cooperation projects in the nuclear field with almost all BRICS+ countries.

India, China, Egypt, and Iran account for almost 60% of all nuclear power plants (13 out of 21) that Russia is building abroad. Russia supplies enriched uranium to Brazil and South Africa for their nuclear power plants. Last year, a roadmap was signed with Ethiopia to develop cooperation in the field of nuclear energy, which envisages the possibility of constructing a nuclear power plant or a nuclear research center in the country.

Therefore, further cooperation within the BRICS+ framework, one of the few international associations from which Russia has not been excluded, could strengthen Russia’s position in the markets of these countries.

However, in addition to Russia, China also possesses a large and developed nuclear industry within BRICS+ and has no less significant ambitions. Therefore, the emergence of an additional platform for cooperation within BRICS+ can undoubtedly enrich both China and Russia, but does not guarantee a superior or dominant position for the latter
»

Rosatom’s projects abroad in brief ↑

El-Dabaa NPP, Egypt. On 6 October, work began on installing the core catcher body at power unit 3.

Akkuyu NPP, Turkey. On 4 October, the main circulating pump motors for unit 1 were installed in their design positions. On October 15th, the installation of two low-pressure rotors was completed in the turbine hall of the same unit. All major large-scale components of the turbine unit have now been installed in their design positions, and the installation of the turbine-generator rotor was completed on 25 October.

Rooppur NPP, Bangladesh. On 21 October, it was reported that the reactor assembly at power unit 1 had been completed. The reactor assembly process included the installation of in-vessel components such as the shaft and baffle, loading of fuel assembly simulators, installing of a protective pipes unit and an upper unit, SAMS sensors. The next stage is to conduct hydraulic tests, during which the operability of the reactor plant equipment will be verified.

Center of nuclear research and technology, Bolivia. The Rosatom Novosibirsk Chemical Concentrate Plant has manufactured the first nuclear fuel for the initial loading of the BRR-1 test research reactor at the National Center for Nuclear Research and Technology which is under construction in Bolivia. Fuel delivery is scheduled for 2025

Separate extended commentary on a significant event of the month

Rosatom head reports to Russian President on work results ↑

On 15 October, Rosatom head Aleksey Likhachev and President Putin held a work meeting to discuss the work results of the state corporation. Bellona publishes a brief survey of the event in the form of a separate extended commentary by the head of Bellona’s nuclear project Alexander Nikitin.

Rosatom’s commentary on the meeting between Putin and Likhachev held in October contains a brief and sometimes even humorous account of what they discussed.

Predictably, Likhachev tirelessly listed all the achievements and success of the nuclear corporation for Putin, starting with the fact that in 2024 Rosatom achieved record financial results, remains the world leader in nuclear energy, is building NPPs all over the world and developing nuclear weapons.

Likhachev did not miss the chance to mention that Rosatom is busy developing the Northern Sea Route, a project dear to Putin’s heart, while Putin’s friend Kovalchuk, the head of the Kurchatov Institute, has proposed a fantastic (in the literal sense of the word) project for a nuclear gas carrier submarine. Of course, Rosatom fully supports this project and is ready to implement it. Judging from the video, Putin enjoyed listening to all of this bragging.

But it is unlikely that in this very difficult wartime situation, Putin summoned Likhachev to listen to all of these tales, or about Rosatom’s achievements in developing renewable energy, quantum computers, transforming a nuclear corporation into a knowledge corporation and so on.

We may assume that the most interesting aspect of this meeting for Putin was the discussion on the further development of nuclear weapons, as well as weapons based on new principles of physics and non-nuclear armaments for the needs of the “special military operation”. If Likhachev discussed this topic, this is evidence that Rosatom one of the key players that is deeply involved in the war in Ukraine.

It is also notable that the official reports from this meeting make no mention of any discussion about the situation at the Zaporizhzhia NPP. This omission could point to certain underlying aspects or developments concerning the facility.

It is entirely possible that Putin and Likhachev did not address or discuss this topic because no military or political actions are currently being planned. Similarly, there may be no technical or operational changes anticipated at the ZNPP that could affect its nuclear safety or pose a radiation risk to the surrounding area. This suggests that, for now, there are no plans to bring the ZNPP reactors out of cold shutdown, which is supported by reports following Sergei Kiriyenko’s most recent visit to the plant.

The future of this facility remains uncertain, particularly given the potential shifts in the geopolitical landscape following the U.S. elections. If a decision is made to return the ZNPP to its internationally recognized owner, Ukraine, such a move would require thorough discussion and advance preparation. Similarly, discussions would be necessary if the decision is made to retain the captured nuclear facility under Russian control. Concerns are further heightened by Putin’s meeting with Balitsky, the head of the occupied Zaporizhzhia region, which included a closed-door discussion about the ZNPP. This raises questions about whether the facility is being readied for specific developments.

Of course, this is all speculative. However, the widely publicized meetings between the president of a country which occupies both a nuclear facility and the territory of a neighboring state with the heads of the nuclear agency and the occupation administration inevitably give rise to questions and expectations, perhaps not very positive ones.