News
Publish date: July 24, 2024
News
After Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Bellona ceased its activity in the aggressor country. On 18 April 2023, the Russian general prosecutor’s office declared Bellona to be an undesirable organization.
However, we continue to monitor events in the field of nuclear and radiation safety relating to Russia and Ukraine, which we believe are of interest to foreign readers. We analyze the situation in order to assess the degree of Russia’s international influence on other countries and the risks connected with this. We present you with a survey of these events for May 2024, with comments by experts of Bellona’s nuclear project Alexander Nikitin and Dmitry Gorchakov.
Follow the links to read the last three digests for April, March, February. Subscribe to our mailing list to make sure you don’t miss the next digest. Download a PDF of this digest here.
NUCLEAR EVENTS IN UKRAINE AND THE WAR
1. Zaporizhzhia NPP. Event timeline for May 2024
2. Energoatom specialists visit Belene NPP site
INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR EVENTS AND THEIR CONNECTION WITH RUSSIA
3. Kazatomprom and sanction risks linked with Russia
4. Reaction to the ban on importing of Russian enriched uranium to USA
5. Prospects for producing of western HALEU
EVENTS IN THE RUSSIAN NUCLEAR SECTOR AND IN ROSATOM PROJECTS ABROAD
6. Russia to build SNPP in Uzbekistan
7. Russian government expands Rosatom’s financial powers
8. Construction schedule for Rossiya icebreaker shifted forward
9. Rosatom’s projects abroad in brief
Military threats. In May IAEA inspectors at the ZNPP, like in previous months, heard military activities practically every day some distance away from the plant: artillery and rocket fire, as well as small arms fire. On 26 May four explosions were heard around the plant site, but ZNPP representatives informed the inspectors that there was no damage to the plant.
In May, the IAEA reported several air raid alarms at the ZNPP, during which movement outside of buildings was restricted. The first time, on 8 May, the restrictions were in force for about 90 minutes. Experts were informed that the alarm was set off by drones detected over the area of the cooling pond, but they reported that they did not hear a single explosion during the restriction period. On 9 May, because of an air raid alarm a planned walkdown within the site perimeter was postponed. At the end of the week movement outside the buildings was restricted for 24 hours, but during this time IAEA experts also did not hear any explosions.
It was reported in late April that in the vicinity of unit 6 and the training center, launch pads and a training base for drone operators had been established. On 2 May the Ukrainian Main Directorate of Intelligence published a recording of a video captured from a Russian drone that flew over the plant towards Ukrainian territory. This information was provided to the IAEA by the Ukrainian Permanent Mission in Vienne.
The IAEA reports that experts did not find evidence of drone launches or training and launching pads, but requested access to the roof of the nearby laboratory building. The request is currently being examined.
Staff situation: In early May, according to information from ZNPP representatives around 5,000 employees were working at the plant. Before the outbreak of the war the staff at the ZNPP numbered around 11,500, but the Russian side informed experts that according to Russian standards, the required number of NPP staff was significantly lower than according to Ukrainian standards. Russian representatives of the ZNPP stated in May there were still 800 open positions, but for the current state of the NPP, when all reactors are in cold shutdown mode, the staff numbers are sufficient, including authorized operators for the main control rooms. (Incidentally, the IAEA reports that their inspectors continue to be prevented from freely talking to main control room staff, and cannot assess the knowledge and experience of these employees.)
As for maintenance of equipment and systems, the plant has begun to hire more contractors than previously, and several training instructors have also been hired.
In the second half of May, IAEA inspectors visited the training center of the ZNPP where they observed main control room staff undergoing training on the full-scope simulators, and also had some discussions on the training of personnel.
On 15 May, the IAEA experts observed an emergency drill at the ZNPP, based on a hypothetical scenario of damage to a pipe connected to one of the sprinkler ponds providing water to cool reactor unit 1 and its safety systems. Under the exercise scenario, plant staff pumped water into the sprinkler pond and repaired the damaged pipe, while also ensuring that the safety systems and diesel generators remained operational. The IAEA experts assessed the exercise as well organized and the actions of the personnel as effective.
Maintenance and spare part provision. In May maintenance work was resumed on part of the safety system of unit 1 after it was postponed in March. Electrical maintenance activities on the unit 2 main transformer as well as on one of the plant’s backup power transformers also began. The cleaning of one of the sprinkler ponds, which supplies water for the cooling of units 6 and 5 and their safety systems, was completed.
At the end of May experts observed maintenance work on emergency core cooling system of the unit 1 reactor (cleaning of the heat exchanger in the pump room of the fuel pool) and the main electrical transformer of unit 2 (repair works on the transformer’s oil cooling system).
In May the IAEA team visited the site’s main warehouse facility. They examined a range of electrical spare parts including small and medium sized transformers and electrical control cabinets, as well as larger electrical and mechanical equipment, all stored properly and in good condition. However, the experts noted that much of the electrical equipment originated from western suppliers and was delivered before the outbreak of war.
At the thermal mechanical warehouse, the IAEA team saw its diesel generator spare parts and electrical equipment, some of which as well was supplied by Western manufacturers before the war.
The ZNPP representative informed the IAEA team that in May it had completed its transition to a Russian-based spare parts and equipment database, and that now purchases would be made from Russian suppliers.
The IAEA experts also visited the Chemistry Control Division, where they were told that all necessary consumables and chemical reagents were being supplied from the Russian Federation and that the division has sufficient staff, including from Russian NPPs.
14 May The Russian Permanent Mission to the International Organizations sent the IAEA a report on the state of the ZNPP and measures being carried out there (including measures concerning repair works and staff training). The report also noted that the ZNPP is integrated into the system of purchases of the Russian Federation, and that there were no difficulties with spare parts and equipment, because the design of the ZNPP is similar to the design of the Balakovo, Kalinin and Rostov NPPs.
The report also describes the situation with the plant’s water supply. It is indicated that sprinkler ponds can be replenished from wells drilled in 2023. In total, all the existing wells provide around 300 m3/h of water, while the required water supply for the needs of the ZNPP is 6000 m3 per day (250 m3/h). There are also 18 mobile pumping stations at the plant, and if necessary similar stations may be delivered from other NPPs.
Additionally, it has been decided to build a pumping station for the cooling pond which will provide an average supply of water of up to 18,000 m3/h.
5 June The Permanent Mission of Ukraine published a reply to this report by the Russian Federation, stating that mainly Ukrainian and foreign (not Russian) equipment is used at the ZNPP, and so under the occupation the Russian side has not been able to carry out the major repairs required under the established norms.
As for the situation with the plant’s water supply since the destruction of the Kakhovka dam, the report states that replenishing water supplies from riverbank pump stations and movable pump machines by the cooling pond will lead to a drop in the water level in the cooling pond and the entire circulation system, which may cause a malfunction in the equipment of the sprinkler ponds. Using wells to replenish water in these systems does not comply with plant design conditions.
Regarding the staff situation at the ZNPP, the Ukrainian Permanent Mission states that after February 1, 2024, employees who did not sign labor contracts with Rosatom were no longer permitted to work, so there is a shortage of main control room personnel licensed according to Ukrainian standards, and of training center instructors who have experience in working with ZNPP equipment and are able to train qualified specialists. Rosatom instructors do not have sufficient knowledge and qualifications to train personnel. They also lack the required practical work experience.
The report also notes that the emergency drill exercises which the Russian Federation carries out at the ZNPP do not include scenarios when the external power supply is cut off, although a power cut to the plant is what presents the greatest threat at present.
Other events. On 23 May there was a power cut to the only available 750 kV power line, and for over three hours the ZNPP received electricity by the reserve 330 kV line. According to ZNPP representatives, the power cut on the main line was caused by a short circuit which took place around 6 km from the 750 kV open switchyard on territory controlled by the Russian Federation.
The warm weather led to forest fires breaking out in the environs of the plant. In late May IAEA experts reported two fires, one on the side of the Dnipro opposite the plant, and another to the south of the 750 kV open switchyard. The latter fire was evidently extinguished and did not cause any damage to electrical systems.
28 May IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi met with high-ranking Russian officials in Kaliningrad: Rosatom director Aleksey Likhachev, the head of Rostekhnadzor Alexander Trembitsky, representatives of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, troops of Radiological, Chemical and Biological Defence of the Russian Armed Forces and the National Guard Troops Federal Service. Grossi once more stressed the factors that presented problems for the nuclear safety of the ZNPP: the vulnerability of the external power supply of the plant, the lack of reliable water supply for cooling reactors and other functions, and also the staff situation and technical maintenance.
After the meeting Grossi stated “In view of these challenging and unprecedented circumstances – with Europe’s largest nuclear power plant located in a war zone – there is an understanding that its six reactors should remain in cold shutdown for the time being.”
Nevertheless, as TASS reported, after the meeting Grossi said that at present circumstances do not make it possible to speak of restarting the plant, “but this does not stop us from discussing questions about how we may organize this restart in future, when conditions are observed.”
He also stated that “any decision to re-start the ZNPP’s reactors in the future – when it is safe to do so – must be preceded by a very careful and detailed examination of all operational and regulatory aspects relevant for nuclear safety and security.”
Information is given below about walkdowns carried out by the IAEA team and described in May IAEA updates and information circulars of the Russian Federation Permanent Mission in Vienna (this information is given in italics).
4 – 9 May (Update 227, INFCIRC/1209)
– Two fresh fuel storage facilities.
– Walkdown within the site perimeter with radiation monitoring devices, all measurements within norms (the IAEA team makes these walkdowns regularly, which is stated in information circulars of the Russian Federation in recent months).
– Measured water levels in sprinkler pools, there is enough water for reactors in cold shutdown.
10 – 16 May (Update 228, INFCIRC/1212)
– Units 1-6: main control rooms (observed staff work, but were unable to communicate with employees)
– Unit 2: reactor building and safety systems rooms (steam generators and pressurizer were observed). No boron leaks were detected in the inspection, in general the situation at the inspected areas was satisfactory, except from an oil leak coming from the crane.
– Walkdown within the site perimeter and several buildings which they were permitted to inspect to monitor adherence to the five concrete principles for protection of the plant. They did not observe any heavy weapons or indications that drones could have been launched from the plant (but not all areas of the site were inspected).
17-23 May (Update 229, INFCIRC/1214)
– Unit 3: reactor building and safety systems rooms (key equipment was examined such as steam generators and the main cooling pump. Experts did not detect traces of boron, but did notice a small water leak from the ventilation pipe, which they were informed would be serviced as part of upcoming maintenance); the turbine hall, where they examined some equipment but once again did not receive access to the western part of the hall.
– Unit 2: turbine hall.
24-30 May (Update 230, INFCIRC/1214, INFCIRC/1219)
– Unit 4: reactor building and safety system rooms (experts inspected steam generators, main cooling pumps, rooms of the backup control room and backup diesel power station of the third safety system train). They noticed some oil on the floor of the reactor hall coming from the overhead cranes, as well as boron deposits on the floors of some of the safety systems rooms. The ZNPP confirmed these problems would be addressed.
– Unit 5: four levels of the turbine building, where experts observed various equipment (including main feedwater pumps, main steam valves and main condenser), but were denied access to the western side of the building.
– Experts also visited the temporary shelters located inside each reactor building which were established in 2022, where up to 1000 people can be sheltered.
– Joint auxiliary building
– Unit 2: onshore pumping station.
– Unit 6: main control room.
«The situation at ZNPP can be described with a phrase from the Alice in Wonderland: “…curiouser and curiouser…”
Within the plant perimeter, for IAEA mission members a system of martial law has practically been created, with severe restrictions.
Air raids alarms are periodically announced, when the entire IAEA staff must hide in shelters. By a strange coincidence, this increasingly occurs at times when they are supposed to be inspecting facilities. The Russian Federation reports that every week they capture hundreds of drones launched by Ukraine, but no one, including IAEA representatives, hears any explosions and firing at drones that are supposedly flying overhead (at least there is no mention of this in IAEA reports for May). It is impossible to say for certain if this is a real threat, or if it is a training exercise and a way to show the IAEA mission that Ukraine constantly threatens the NPP from the air (which is what Likhachev says every time it happens).
IAEA representatives are not permitted to speak with plant staff. Why not? IAEA members may receive information only from specially appointed people who accompany them. It is impossible to check the reliability of information from these people. Neither the Russian side nor IAEA representatives give any explanation of this situation.
Part of the plant territory and some of the rooms in facilities important for ensuring nuclear and radiation security remain closed for inspection by the IAEA mission. Again, the question arises – why? There are no public explanations by the Russian administration, or any information about this situation from the IAEA mission.
IAEA members are taken to observe staged emergency training drills (from my own experience I know that these drills are usually a staged performance), and training exercises by ZNPP staff on simulators. What for? To convince the IAEA that there are no problems with the staff?
Thus, the IAEA mission’s presence at the NPP does not solve any vital problems there, because the experts have very limited capabilities. The IAEA plays the role of a symbolic international watchdog, which can also gather a limited amount of information about events at the plant, as far as Russia permits it to do so.
As for the maintenance and equipment repair that is reported, it is impossible to assess the extent and quality of these works properly, given how the IAEA mission operates. Certain aspects that the mission observes do not prove anything.
Here another question arises: if Rosatom actually carries out the maintenance stipulated by the operating instructions, as well as some repair work, then what is the goal of these actions?
We believe there are several possibilities here:
1) Rosatom is preparing to re-start one of the power units. But then why is maintenance being carried out at unit 1 which uses American fuel, which means that starting this power unit is quite unrealistic;
2) Rosatom is planning to operate the ZNPP in future (after the end of military operations), i.e. it do not intend to return the plant to Ukraine;
3) this is simply a demonstration for the international community (the IAEA) that Rosatom takes true professional concern in the safety and technical state of the NPP, and also a way to give that the remaining staff some work to do (so they are not simply paid a salary for nothing).
And finally, the issue of staff is not fully clear. Firstly, there is the question of whether the plant has sufficient staff, and secondly, the fact that all technical documentation (especially for operators) was at one time (according to the Russian side) translated into Ukrainian in accordance with Ukrainian standards and requirements, especially concerning the use of new (US) cores, operating reactor control and protection systems, and their maintenance.
So we may ask how staff hired from Russian NPPs (especially operators) can cope with reading technical documents in Ukrainian, for example reactor operation manuals. Without using these manuals, it is prohibited to operate an energy facility, and not even the most experienced staff will be able to operate a reactor at full capacity, not to mention dealing with emergencies. Every member of the NPP staff has their own working instructions which they strictly follow. Russia has announced that their staff structure differs from the Ukrainian one, i.e. all the operating documentation must be adjusted to comply with the new staff structure.
This issue is a vitally important one, we believe, but there seems to be no solution in sight. There is no information from Rosatom or the IAEA about this problem. Perhaps because neither Rosatom nor the IAEA are seriously considering operation of the ZNPP, and all that we are seeing are certain forced or demonstrational actions in a situation of the military seizure of the plant.
In analyzing all of what we have described above, along with other information, one gets the impression that Russia has not developed any strategic vision of the future for this NPP. Russia will not be able to use the ZNPP in the near future without carrying out a number of fundamental works (see our analysis in the report “The potential restart of the Zaporizhzhia NPP: Analysis of technical and political aspects”). If the NPP is returned to Ukraine, then Ukraine’s Energoatom will have to conduct a global revision and testing of all equipment, replace fuel in the reactors, retrain the staff and carry out many other measures required for the safe and reliable operation of an NPP»
On 13 May Energoatom specialists visited the Belene NPP site in Bulgaria, to inspect the project equipment and its technical documentation (talks on purchase began in July 2023). The Ukrainian delegation observed the equipment conservation process, which aims to preserve a condition corresponding to operation requirements (Rosatom is in charge of conservation).
In March Energoatom CEO Petro Kotin said that the company hoped to sign a contract on purchasing the equipment of the nuclear island in June 2024. This concerns two reactors, four steam generators and four circulation pumps (manufactured in Russia under a contract from 2008).
On 24 May the Bulgarian government passed a resolution that the National Electric Company may sell the unit power transformer to the Kozloduy NPP that was delivered for the Belene NPP project, for realization of the program to extend the service life of units 5 and 6. Previously filters units, ventilators and other components intended for the Belene NPP were already acquired for use at the Kozloduy NPP. Last year the issue was also raised concerning the use of steam generators at unit 6 of the Kozloduy NPP.
«Debates surrounding the construction of new units at the Khmelnitsky NPP show no sign of abating, especially in Ukraine. Recently the Energoatom management has been increasingly vocal in the Ukrainian media, responding to critics who ask the question: why is it is so necessary to build new power units during wartime, which require financial, human and other resources which are currently in a major deficit in Ukraine. Energoatom claims that the construction of new units is essential for developing nuclear power and to ensure that the country’s electricity needs are met. These explanations are understandable, but unfortunately unconvincing, as there are far more urgent tasks at present which demand resources. So it remains a question of priorities…»
On 30 April Kazatomprom published its integrated annual report for 2023. It assesses the war between Russia and Ukraine as a key geopolitical risk for the company’s development, given the possibility of sanctions being placed on Russia, Rosatom and its subsidiaries, and also the suspension of goods transportation through Russian territory (this includes both transit and problems with delivering goods by ships departing from Russian ports).
The report indicates that in 2023 several physical deliveries of uranium were carried out by the alternative Transcaspian International Transport Route (TITR): to Romania, the USA and Canada. This accounted for 64% of all uranium deliveries to western countries. (The report for operational activity for the fourth quarter of 2023 states that 71% of export western transport deliveries were planned on the TITR but that this figure dropped because of unscheduled shipment to France). At the same time, transportation of uranium oxide to conversion plants of Honeywell (USA), Cameco (Canada) and Orano (France) was carried out via St. Petersburg (northern transport route).
The report on the realization of the Concept for the development of the fuel and energy complex of Kazakhstan for 2023, published on 2 May by the Kazakhstan Energy Ministry, states that Kazatomprom transported around 2,300 tons of uranium by the TITR to France, Canada, Romania, India and the USA, which is 4.5% more than in 2022 (a total of 21,100 tons was produced in Kazkahstan in 2023). It also states that with the aim of diversifying export routes, Kazakhstan is holding talks with China, developing an agreement to provide uranium transit services through China.
The Kazatomprom annual report also notes the reputation risks and risks of corporate management connected with the involvement of Russian partners in Kazatomprom’s subsidiary, associated and joint companies. On the date that the report was published, Rosatom’s partner companies in six uranium producing enterprises in Kazakhstan had not been included on sanction lists. But Kazatomprom has a plan of action to minimalize possible negative consequences, which is updated depending on the circumstances.
As for the law passed on 13 May in the USA prohibiting the import of Russian enriched uranium, Kazatomprom, which produces uranium in a number of joint enterprises with Rosatom subsidiaries, notes that this will not affect the company’s activity, as it produces natural uranium, and regardless of who makes the delivery – Kazatomprom or its partners – natural uranium preserves its Kazakhstan origin until its delivery to conversion plants.
«Rosatom’s long-standing and reliable partner in Kazakhstan, Kazatomprom, is keeping a close eye on the sanctions on its Russian partner, and evidently is prepared to fulfill the existing western restrictions placed on Rosatom, but does not intend to do so to the detriment of its own interests. In just a few years the new TITR route for transporting uranium to western customers bypassing Russia has reached a considerable capacity and has potential for growth, if the trend continues for western partners to reduce work with the Russian nuclear sector»
On 13 May, US president Joe Biden signed a law banning import of low-enriched uranium manufactured in Russia or by Russian companies. The ban will officially come into effect on 11 August.
Russia’s reaction to the ban was predictable: Rosatom called the law discriminatory and non-market-oriented, stressing its political subtext, and Russian government representatives made similar statements.
The law provides waivers for companies that can prove they have no alternative sources and that continuing deliveries is in the national interests of the USA.
On 16 May Bloomberg reported that the Russian company Tenex (a Rosatom subsidiary that carries out deliveries of uranium) had informed its US clients (including the major US NPP operator Constellation Energy Corp., Centrus Energy, the reseller of Russian low-enriched uranium in the USA, and also the companies Duke Energy Corp. and Dominion Energy Inc.) that force-majeure circumstances had come into effect connected with the uncertainty that the US nuclear power faced after the law was passed, and recommended that its clients receive waivers from the import ban over the next 60 days. If a waiver is not received in this period, companies may face delays in deliveries.
Commodity Insights, which also has a copy of this notification, writes that Tenex advised clients to make the choice, either to agree to an indefinite delay in receiving enriched uranium, or to sign a financial agreement on payment regardless on receiving a waiver in the course of 60 days from the 14 May, the notification date.
Representatives of US companies and Rosatom declined to comment on the letter.
In December, when the draft law was approved in the House of Representatives, Bloomberg wrote that a number of US energy companies which are clients of Tenex had received a warning from the Rosatom subsidiary that in response to the law banning import of low-enriched uranium from Russia, the Kremlin could unilaterally ban the export of its nuclear fuel to the USA. Rosatom denied these reports, stressing that the company would continue to fulfill its contractual obligations. This time Rosatom repeats that “priorities in international activity remain the observance and implementation of contractual obligations taken on, and also preserving partner relations with clients.”
In its report for the first quarter of 2024 published on 7 May, the company Centrus immediately stated that it would apply for a waiver from the ban, in order to continue supplying low enriched uranium to its clients (even without the waiver, the company has adequate liquidity to support its business operations for at least the next 12 months).
Before the law was passed, on 30 April, the US Energy Ministry held a meeting with representatives of the US nuclear industry, to answer numerous questions concerning procedures and criteria for receiving waivers from the import ban on Russian LEU. One representative of the industry said (speaking anonymously) that the Energy Ministry had stated it would take a “mild approach, especially over the next few years”, to approve waivers for end users.
On 22 May, the US Energy Ministry published a guide for receiving waivers from the ban on uranium from Russia. The document described that the law has no definition of what should be considered an alternative viable source of LEU, but as an alternative supplier must be determined and provided many months before the planned reloading of fuel, the issue of the loading time of reactors will be a significant factor in examining the application from the end user.
Waivers from import in the US national interests apply to cases when import is necessary to maintain the viability of a US nuclear energy company that is critical for the US nuclear energy fuel chain, or when import is designed to support an existing arrangement to provide fuel for an NPP in another country (for example in Mexico and Japan), and thus minimize the likelihood of that country seeking a non-US fuel supplier.
As reported earlier, the law banning the import of Russian LEU will allow the Energy Ministry to receive USD $2.7 billion for the development and support of the domestic uranium industry. In June the US government plans to publish a request for proposals for a sum of USD $3.4 billion for the supply of domestic LEU.
Centrus Energy, which already participates in a program for creating US facilities for producing HALEU (see below) evidently plans to take part in the manufacture of LEU as well: the company report for the first quarter of 2024 states that the company signed conditional obligations for the sale of LEU for a sum of around USD $900 million to support potential construction of facilities for LEU production.
«We have already written about the consequences of passing the law banning deliveries of Russian enriched uranium to the USA in a separate article. The main conclusion in assessing the reaction to this ban from Russia is the lack of any political decisions and retaliatory bans by the Kremlin. At least at present. But in all probability, there will not be any. And Rosatom will strive to keep working on the US market as long as existing rules and laws allow it»
On 8 May the UK government reported that the country was the first in Europe to invest funds in the creation of its own production facility for HALEU (High-Assay Low-Enriched Uranium), which will be used as fuel for modern modular reactors. The government is allocating £196 million to Urenco, partially owned by the UK government, to build a uranium enrichment plant at the Capenhurst site in Cheshire, and expects that by 2031 the new Urenco plant will produce up to 10 tons of HALEU per year.
Boris Schucht, Urenco CEO, said that in July last year the UK had already allocated £9.5 million to Urenco for designing a plant and HALEU production processes as part of the strategy to force Russia out of the world energy market. Financing is part of the British HALEU program for £300 million announced in January this year. The release states that Urenco will cofinance the plant.
It is planned that the remaining funds will be allocated later this year, and will be used to support conversion capabilities and finance studies on innovative nuclear fuel and possibilities of regulation and transportation.
In the USA a demonstrational cascade for HALEU production is already functioning: Centrus Energy began operations on enrichment in October last year, and in November it carried out the first delivery of 20 kg of HALEU to the US government. It is planned that the cascade will produce a total of 900 kg of uranium product per year.
In its report for the first quarter of 2024 Centrus stated that over this period it had delivered around 130 kg of enriched uranium. The company also submitted applications for the request for proposals from the Energy Ministry for HALEU deconversion and enrichment, to receive financing for expanding production facilities of the plant in Piketon.
The French company Framatome, which also submitted an application for the proposals request for HALEU deconversion, reported on 29 May that it had signed agreements with the US company TerraPower for the design and development of a pilot line of metallization of HALEU, which is an important part of the deconversion process (uranium oxide is converted into metal which is then used for manufacturing fuel for modern reactors) at its nuclear fuel production plant in Richland, Washington.
On 27 May a protocol was signed on amendments to the intergovernmental agreement on cooperation between Russia and Uzbekistan to build a nuclear power plant in Uzbekistan. The amendments expand cooperation for building a Small Nuclear Power Plant (SNPP) of Russian design.
Additionally, Atomstroiexport (the engineering division of Rosatom) and NPP Construction Directorate under the Nuclear Power Agency at the Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic of Uzbekistan signed a contract for building an SNPP in Uzbekistan.
The project plans the construction of an SNPP with a capacity of 330 MW (six RITM-200H water reactors with an electrical capacity of 55 MW each, the prototype for which is the RITM-200 reactor for universal nuclear icebreakers) in the Jizak province of Uzbekistan. (At present construction is commencing on an SNPP with this reactor in the Yakut village of Ust-Kuiga; Rosatom received a license for its construction in April 2023). The units will be put into operation one at a time. The start of the first unit is planned for late 2029.
Rosatom is the general contractor for construction. The selected site has already been studied, and its suitability and safety have been confirmed, which will considerably reduce the project realization period.
According to Rosatom head Aleksey Likhachev, this is not just a preliminary agreement, and construction will begin this summer. He also announced that construction would be financed entirely by Uzbekistan, and a state loan from Russia is not under discussion.
The agreement on cooperation for construction of a nuclear power plant in Uzbekistan, to which the amendments were made, was originally signed in 2018. It provided for the construction of two power units with VVER-1200 reactors, but the contract for construction had yet to be signed.
In March 2024 the first deputy head of Rosatom Kirill Komarov reported that talks between Uzbekistan and Russia on the NPP were proceeding “quite successfully”. In April Russian deputy prime minister and head of the Ministry for Industry and Tarde Denis Manturov announced that the contract for the construction of a large NPP in Uzbekistan was already being prepared, and the site selected for it was in the Jizak province, near Tuzkan Lake (note – apparently the SNPP will be built on the same site). By this time, specialists had already studied the site in detail, and determined the most optimal technological solutions, while technical issues of integrating the NPP into the energy system of Uzbekistan are now being studied. The project is valued at USD 11 billion, and it is planned to be put into operation in 2033.
However, in early May the head of Uzatom Azim Akhmejajaev said: “We are simply holding talks at present, with general words so far and nothing specific. The Russian side is also talking generally, but they are giving some details and bringing this to a different level. On the whole, there is nothing specific yet. Just general words.” Akhmejajaev also said that no talks on nuclear power were being held with other countries.
«One gets the impression that the signing of the agreement to build a Russian SNPP in Uzbekistan came as a surprise, especially for neighboring Kazakhstan. As we can see from reports, Likhachev is already giving specific dates for the beginning of construction. Rosatom is very keen and in a hurry to “stake a claim” in the Central Asian and Caucasian NPP construction market. At the same time, judging by events in Kazakhstan and Armenia (for example), it is not certain that its expectations will be entirely fulfilled. So we will wait and see…»
«There are grounds to believe that the construction of an SNPP of 330 MW in Uzbekistan may be a substitute for previously existing plans to build a major NPP with two VVER-1200 units of a capacity of 2400 MW. This is shown by the fact that the same site was chosen that had been studied for building a large NPP, and also the lack of progress on talks concerning a major plant over the course of many years. At the same time, this substitute may be beneficial for both sides.
Rosatom has received its first foreign order for a small NPP and has made progress in realizing plans to build NPPs in Uzbekistan, while the lower cost of the project (which may come to 3-4 billion Euros according to our calculations) will mean that it can be financed entirely by Uzbekistan. It will be easier for Uzbekistan to finance this project and resolve to complete it because of the smaller scale involved, without the need to take out a loan from Russia. At the same time, the relative cost of building a small NPP may be greater than a large one, which may lead to an increase in the price of its electricity»
On 21 May the Russian State Duma passed a draft law in the first reading which gives Rosatom the right to issue bonds. It is expected that this decision will allow Rosatom to move to the investment category of creditors on the financial market and will help to reduce interest rates for sector organizations for loans taken out under Rosatom’s patronage (owing to pressure from sanctions, the capabilities of the Russian banking system for providing long-term financing at a low interest rate are significantly limited).
According to the draft law, the decisions on issuing bonds, and also decisions on approving the bonds program, will be passed by the Rosatom supervisory board. It was stated in the State Duma that the law was dictated by restrictions that had arisen in providing bank loans to companies to develop their own production capacities.
Another task that the draft law will solve is the use of Rosatom’s competencies at a federal level in ensuring technological independence of critical information infrastructure facilities. The law specifies Rosatom’s powers on issues of joint work in this sphere with federal bodies of executive power and the Bank of Russia. Rosatom will also be able to develop proposals for forming state policy and the regulation of legal standards.
On 20 May at an operational meeting held by Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin with deputy prime ministers, construction of ice-breaker class vessels for the Northern Sea Route (NSR) was discussed. Deputy Prime Minister Denis Manturov (also the head of the ministry for industry and trade) reported that the three icebreakers of 22220 design (capacity of 60 MW) under construction at the Baltic Shipyard are scheduled to join the fleet in the period from 2026 to 2030, and the most powerful icebreaker (capacity of 120 MW) of the Leader 10510 design under construction at the Zvezda Shipyard is planned to be completed by around 2030.
According to the development plan for the NSR up until 2035, construction of the head icebreaker of the Leader design was planned for completion in 2027. Accordingly, the timeframe for realizing the project has been shifted forward by three years. The change in schedule was first reported after the outbreak of war, as construction encountered a number of problems: an increase in the cost of the project (while the funds allocated for construction in the 2024 budget were reduced), and problems with deliveries of units and components.
Manturov also reported that work was continuing on replacing critical vessel equipment parts (in April 2023 this task was included in the NSR development plan). In 2022 a separate subsidy was allocated to this task, and at Mansurov present budget financing for it comes to around 17 billion rubles. It is planned that the first items of equipment will appear on the market next year, including for ice class vessels.
«In the wartime situation the state’s economy, and accordingly also such state giants as Rosatom, are unstable. Saturating the state military and industrial complex with money, when its equipment is depleted every day, leads to underfinancing, i.e. the weakening of the civil section of the economy.
Rosatom is a structure which has a defense complex with guaranteed state financing and a very large civil energy, scientific and industrial section. The corporation needs money to solve economic and other tasks within the country, and also for building its sites abroad.
Rosatom strives to expand its construction market abroad, but the countries where it develops projects usually require privileged conditions for NPP construction and additional financing of various social and other fields. During the war, the Russian budget has cut back its financing of Rosatom’s domestic expenditure, which has expanded recently, and also financing its projects abroad.
This is why the decision was made to issue bonds, giving the corporation business functions that it did not have before, along with other bureaucratic and economic solutions designed to provide additional financing for Rosatom»
Akkuyu NPP, Turkey. A transport airlock was installed in the design position on unit 1 of the Akkuyu NPP on 2 May, designed for insulation of inner rooms from the ambient environment, and safe transportation of nuclear materials and equipment of the reactor compartment. On 6 May installation of the horizontal moisture separator reheaters in the turbine hall was completed. At unit 2 assembly of the roof of the turbine building has been completed, and closing the thermal circuit will make it possible to begin assembly of the turbine generator set.
On 18 May the director for construction and production organization of Akkuyu Nuclear Denis Sezemin reported that the planned date for putting unit 1 into operation was April 2025.
Initially it was planned that unit 1 would be started to coincide with the 100th anniversary of the Republic of Turkey in 2023 (Republic Day in Turkey is celebrated on 29 October). In August 2023 it was reported that electricity generation at power unit 1 of Akkuyu NPP would begin on 29 October 2024. This was also reported on March 2024, but with reservations concerning difficulties in construction.
Now it is announced that “work is being carried out in full accordance with the previously approved schedule”. Sezemin states that according to the intergovernmental agreement, Rosatom has 7 years before commercial electricity generation begins. The license for construction of unit 1 was issued in April 2018, so putting the unit into operation in 2025 does not violate the agreement conditions.
On 11 July, a Russian State Duma delegation made a visit to Turkey, where the chairman of the energy committee Pavel Zavalny announced that the plant would definitely be put into operation according to the contract obligations. He also commented that a number of external factors had made it difficult to meet Turkey’s request to hasten the start of unit 1: the coronavirus pandemic in 2020 which caused problems with staff; then in February 2023 Turkey was hit by an earthquake, and construction machinery was diverted from the plant for repairing earthquake damage.
He said the third factor was sanctions on Russia: “This caused delays in delivering equipment that had already been paid for. Some equipment has not yet been delivered. For example, this applies to power delivery systems and other devices which are not manufactured in Russia or Turkey. We purchased them from Siemens. This equipment has already been ordered in China, and this year they should deliver it to us.”
He also reported that because of the refusal to provide special vessels for submerging the water reactor units the project had to be changed, as there is no other method for mounting these structures. “Several billion dollars were paid in advance for equipment delivery. But the funds have not been returned, and the equipment has not been delivered.”
Tianwan NPP, China. On 14 May Atommash shipped a VVER-1200 nuclear reactor vessel and two steam generators for power unit 8.
Kudankulam NPP, India. The Petrozadvoskmash machine-building plant (part of the Rosatom machine-building division) manufactured and shipped on 16 May four shells of the main circulation pump systems for unit 5 of the Kudankulam NPP.
El-Dabba NPP, Egypt. On 16 May, the first tier of the inner containment of the reactor building of power unit 1 was installed in the design position.
While Moscow pushes ahead with major oil, gas and mining projects in the Arctic—bringing more pollution to the fragile region—the spoils of these undertakings are sold to fuel Russia’s war economy, Bellona’s Ksenia Vakhrusheva told a side event at the COP 29, now underway in Baku, Azerbaijan.
A survey of events in the field of nuclear and radiation safety relating to Russia and Ukraine.
«The EU will now become substantially more important for climate, technology development, and transition in the coming four years» ...
In this news digest, we monitor events that impact the environment in the Russian Arctic. Our focus lies in identifying the factors that contribute to pollution and climate change.