After Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Bellona ceased its activity in the aggressor country. On 18 April 2023, the Russian general prosecutor’s office declared Bellona to be an undesirable organization.

However, we continue to monitor events in the field of nuclear and radiation safety relating to Russia and Ukraine, which we believe are of interest to foreign readers. We analyze the situation in order to assess the degree of Russia’s international influence on other countries and the risks connected with this. We present you with a survey of these events for September 2024 with comments by Alexander Nikitin and Dmitry Gorchakov, experts of Bellona’s nuclear project.

Follow the links to read the last three digests for August, July and June. Download a PDF of this digest here.

Subscribe to our mailing list to make sure you don’t miss the next digest.

In this issue:

NUCLEAR EVENTS IN UKRAINE AND THE WAR
1. The Zaporizhzhia NPP and other nuclear sites in Ukraine. Event timeline for September 2024

INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR EVENTS AND THEIR CONNECTION WITH RUSSIA
2. Loviisa NPP reactor loaded with first batch of fuel from Westinghouse
3. Orano plans to build enrichment plant in USA
4. Kozloduy NPP in Bulgaria exempted from EU sanction restrictions on Russia

EVENTS IN THE RUSSIAN NUCLEAR SECTOR AND IN ROSATOM PROJECTS ABROAD
5. Rostom publishes annual report for 2023
6. Rosatom announces completion of clean-up of Soviet nuclear legacy in the Far East
7. Rosatom projects abroad in brief

SEPARATE EXTENDED COMMENTARY ON A SIGNIFICANT EVENT OF THE MONTH
8. 68^th IAEA General Conference

Nuclear events in Ukraine and the war

The Zaporizhzhia NPP and other nuclear sites in Ukraine. Event timeline for September 2024 ↑

Military threats. The Zaporizhzhia NPP

On 2 September, the 330 kV backup power line at the ZNPP was disconnected. Shortly after the IAEA team was informed about this, they saw dark smoke in an area close to where the power line was reportedly disconnected, but it was not clear if these events were linked.

Russia reported that the power line was disconnected by automatic operation, caused by military activities. Energoatom reported that damage to the line took place as a result of Russian shelling, and that it would not be possible to repair the line until specialists were guaranteed safety. The line was only reconnected on 5 September.

On 4 September, IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi visited the ZNPP for the fifth time since its capture and occupation in March 2022. He examined the cooling tower that was damaged in a fire in August. Grossi was able to ascend to a level of about 15 meters and examine the damage.

“It is clear that the cooling tower was damaged by the fire, and it may need to be demolished,” he said. “We will continue to closely look into this matter to try to establish what happened and what the consequences will be. Today was an important step in this work as we were able to see for ourselves the full extent of the damage.” (Immediately after the fire in August, members of the IAEA mission at the ZNPP were not able to ascend to the level of the fire, and examined the cooling tower from its foundation, and they were also provided with photo and video materials recorded by ZNPP employees).

Additionally, Grossi visited the pump station of one of the six power units, the cooling pond and the fresh nuclear fuel storage facility.

Throughout the entire month, as in previous months, the IAEA team at the ZNPP heard explosions almost every day, including ones near the plant site.

On 7 September, there was a report of a drone attack on a transport workshop four kilometers from the ZNPP. The IAEA team was able to examine the damage: there was a hole in one roof and two trucks had received minor damages.

On 21 September, the Russian management of the ZNPP informed the IAEA team of an alleged drone strike on a 35/6 kV substation about 300 meters away from the plant, which provides electricity to non-safety related facilities at the ZNPP. On the following day, the IAEA team visited the alleged attack site, and observed some impact on one of the two transformers, and also remains of batteries and metal pieces of the alleged drone.

On 30 September, the IAEA team visited the Raduga electrical substation in Enerhodar, to examine it after an alleged artillery strike on 29 September. The team confirmed that one of the two transformers at the substation had been destroyed, and the second had not been working since June. One purpose of this substation was to provide back-up power to the industrial area near the ZNPP.

IAEA team experts were also informed that the same shelling had damaged another power line connecting the ZNPP to the 150 kV open switchyard of the Zaporizhzhia Thermal Power Plant, and that the damage limits the availability of potential back-up power supplies to the ZNPP.

Emergency exercises at the ZNPP. On 17 September an emergency exercise was conducted at the ZNPP, simulating an accident with a loss of coolant in the unit 1 reactor caused by a large earthquake, followed by a loss of all off-site power and the failure of all three of the unit’s emergency diesel generators. Another part of the exercise scenario simulated a fire in the ZNPP’s training center and injuries to two staff members, requiring an evacuation of the training center and the response of the fire brigade and ambulance. The IAEA team observing the exercise found the response of participating staff to be appropriate.

Military threats. Attacks on critically important energy infrastructure of Ukrainian nuclear plants

On 3 September after a meeting with Ukrainian President Volodymir Zelensky in Kiev IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi announced that following a number of missile attacks on the energy structure of Ukraine, which have either directly (disconnecting NPP reactors from the grid) or indirectly (destabilizing the national grid) threatened the operation of Ukraine’s nuclear facilities, the IAEA will take a more proactive stance to protect the status of the country’s vital energy infrastructure, to ensure this does not impact nuclear safety.

Grossi stated that a group of IAEA experts would be sent to damaged Ukrainian substations in various parts of the country that have been identified as essential for nuclear safety. The experts will assess the situation at these sites and determine possible follow-up actions. As Ukrainian energy minister German Galushchenko says, this concerns ten crucial nodes connected to nuclear power plants.

Access to secure offsite power supplies for all nuclear sites is one of the Seven Indispensable Pillars for ensuring nuclear safety and security during an armed conflict, set out by Director General Grossi in March 2022.

On 12 September the first visit by a group of IAEA experts to one of the electricity substations was held as part of these agreements. IAEA experts together with representatives of Energoatom, Ukrenergo and the State Nuclear Regulatory Inspectorate examined the site and documented the damages received by the substation from missile attacks, and a technical report was drawn up for the IAEA Director General. It was noted that after repairs the substation was working at full capacity.

The IAEA also reports that in September, among equipment delivered by the IAEA for nuclear sites, the Ukrainian Energy Ministry received several shipments of equipment and supplies to help the energy sector ensure reliable power supplies to the Ukrainian NPPs (what kind of supplies was not specified). Additionally, the IAEA signed an agreement with France and Ukraine’s Energoatom regarding support to Ukrainian NPPs, under which Ukraine will receive the necessary spare parts for emergency diesel generators at the South Ukraine NPP.

The mass attack of 26 August on Ukrainian energy infrastructure facilities affected the power supply to the Rivne, South Ukraine, Khmelnitsky and also Chernobyl NPPs.

On 9 September, one of the 330 kV off-site power lines at the Chernobyl NPP was disconnected for 40 minutes. This was caused by a technical issue that was quickly resolved.

On 10 September a 750 kV line at the Rivne NPP that had been cut off since the missile attacks in late August was reconnected.

A 750 kV line at the Khmelnytsky NPP that was damaged in late August was also reconnected.

On 21-22 September, unit 2 of the South Ukraine NPP was switched to cold shutdown to repair the electrical motor of the one of the main cooling pumps damaged in a missile attack on 26 August. On 25 September the unit was reconnected to the grid. The plant was also reconnected to two external powerlines.

IAEA groups at the Khmelnitsky, South Ukraine, Rivne and Chernobyl NPPs report that air raid alarms continue to be sounded at these sites. In September there were many reports of drones flying in the area of these sites (this was reported by IAEA groups, the State Nuclear Regulatory Inspectorate, the Permanent Mission of Ukraine to the International Organizations in Vienna):

• On 4 September drones flew several kilometers away from the Khmelnytsky NPP, and the IAEA group at the site heard them as well as gunfire;
• On 5 and 12 September the IAEA group at the South Ukraine NPP heard drones and gunfire;
• On 12 September drones were also observed in the region of the Khmelnytsky NPP;
• On 13, 18 and 19 September drones were observed at a distance of 1.5 to 6 km from the South Ukraine NPP site (a total of 22 drones);
• On 14 September subcritical installation Neutron Source installation located at the Kharkiv Institute of Physics and Technology was shelled, but did not suffer damage;
• On 18 September drones were reported near the South Ukraine NPP, and 22 drones flew through the area, including one over the plant, and others approximately 1.5 kilometers from the plant.
• On 19 September another 15 drones were detected near the SUNPP site;
• On 20 September 2 drones were detected in the region of the SUNPP;
• On 21 September 8 more drones were also detected there;
• On 22 September an air raid alarm was sounded at the KhNPP, missile fire and a major explosion were heard. The IAEA team was informed that a drone was detected at a distance of 3.4 km from the KhNPP;
• On 25 September a drone flew near the RNPP;
• On 27 September 10 drones flew through the area of the SUNPP;
• On 29 September another 13 drones flew over the same area to the west of the SUNPP site, one of them directly above the site.

Ukraine’s reports to member countries of the IAEA emphasize that by using drones near sensitive zones of Ukrainian NPPs, Russia grossly violates the first of the five concrete principles established by the IAEA Director General.

Events of nuclear diplomacy

At a meeting in Kyiv on 3 September, Ukrainian President Volodymir Zelensky and IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi reached an agreement that the IAEA would provide technical support and nuclear safety advice for Ukraine’s plans to purchase equipment from Bulgaria that was intended for the NPP project in Belene, for the Khmelnytsky NPP. This will help Ukraine ensure that this project continues in accordance with safety standards.

On 4 September the IAEA published a report on the agencies efforts to ensure nuclear safety during the war in Ukraine, covering the problems and achievements of the IAEA mission to protect the ZNPP over the last two years, and also the IAEA’s work at other nuclear facilities in Ukraine. The report notes that besides delivery of equipment to Ukraine, the IAEA has also continued its vital safeguards verification activities across Ukraine, ensuring that there is no diversion of nuclear material for military purposes.

On 6 September another round of intergovernmental consultations was held in Kaliningrad between Russian organizations and the IAEA. The Russian delegation was led by Rosatom CEO Aleksey Likhachev, and the IAEA delegation by IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi. The safety of the Kursk and Zaporizhzhia NPPs was discussed.

On 16-20 September the 68^th IAEA General Conference was held in Vienna, where the resolution “Nuclear safety, security and safeguards in Ukraine” was passed. See the extended commentary for more details.

On 30 September the World Association of Nuclear Operators (WANO) held its 17^th biennial general meeting. A resolution was also passed at this meeting, which emphasized that nuclear safety has no borders. “We declare our firm intention to provide a focused support to Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant, Kursk Nuclear Power Plant and other nuclear power facilities located close to areas of military operations, to the extent necessary for maintaining their safe operation, within WANO competence and mandate.”

Information on walkdowns conducted by the team of experts described in September in IAEA updates and information circulars of the Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation in Vienna (this information is given in italics):

29 August — 5 September (Update 248, INFCIRC/1246)

– 750 kV open switchyard (observed ongoing maintenance work).

– Sprinkler ponds (confirmed that there was sufficient water available to cool the six shutdown reactors).

– Dry spent fuel storage facility.

– Plant training center.

– Unit 6: the backup diesel power station of the second safety system train (observed its testing).

6–13 September (Update 249, INFCIRC/1249)

– Unit 4: electrical and instrumentation and control rooms.

– Units 1 and 2: turbine halls (as usual, access to the western part of the turbine halls was prohibited).

14–19 September (Update 250, INFCIRC/1249)

– Unit 5: pumping station.

– External radiation monitoring laboratory

– Central control room.

– Unit 6: containment and reactor hall.

19–26 September (Update 251, INFCIRC/1252)

– On 25 September the IAEA team was informed that they had not been allowed to conduct a planned walkdown of the external warehouses and diesel fuel storage facility due to the risk from military activities.

– Units 3 and 4: turbine halls (once more without access to their western parts).

– Unit 5: On 23 September the IAEA team conducted a walkdown inside the reactor building, and observed the monthly changeover between cooling pumps of the spent fuel pool as well as some of the main reactor components and safety systems rooms.

– Unit 2: containment and reactor hall.

27 September — 3 October (Update 252)

– 750 kV open switchyard.

– Units 1–6: main control rooms.

– Some of the site’s waterworks facilities.

Commentary by Bellona:

«The situation at Ukraine’s nuclear sites remains consistently alarming. Shelling, fires, attacks on critically vital infrastructure etc… Everyone looks on and tries to predict whether the latest round of drones, missiles and shells will hit or miss their targets. And this game of Russian roulette has been going on for almost three years. But everyone who has watched this game knows how it ends…

Zelensky and Grossi agreed to do an important thing for all of Ukraine – to deploy new IAEA missions at sites of the Ukrainian energy structure, the destruction of which directly or indirectly threatens the operation of Ukraine’s nuclear facilities. The Russians were not happy and accused Zelensky’s government of hiding behind the backs of IAEA inspectors.  Indeed, this is what it looks like, but there is no other option, as otherwise the whole country will freeze in winter and the likelihood of nuclear hazardous incidents at NPPs will increase. Of course, Putin feels no pity for anyone, young or old, but Zelensky is still the president of the Ukrainian people, so for this decision we should be particularly grateful to the IAEA Director General and experts.

Incidentally, if it were possible to deploy UN missions in every settlement subjected to Russian missile and drone attacks, then perhaps many innocent victims would be saved. But for the present we must be content with what we have….

Otherwise, it’s business as usual for the IAEA – experts make walkdowns of the ZNPP facilities that they are allowed to access, they write daily reports on what kind of explosions they hear and how many, and about what they see and what they learn from Russian staff, informally or officially.

Likhachev once again lured Grossi to Kaliningrad for a round of interagency consultations. Usually these consultations are linked to a certain event. This time, it seems likely that Likhachev hoped to gain Grossi’s support in persuading the Ukrainian side not to attack the Kursk NPP, as it is highly vulnerable and to lose this source of energy in western Russia and jeopardize the new Kursk-2 NPP under construction, which would be a disaster. Also, according to the official report, they discussed the ZNPP, where nothing much new has happened since the cooling tower caught fire in August.

We can only hope that although the “Russian roulette” continues, it will all end without any incidents at nuclear facilities in Ukraine and Russia»

International nuclear events and their connection with Russia

Loviisa NPP reactor loaded with first batch of fuel from Westinghouse ↑

On 2 September, Nordic energy company Fortum reported that in August, Westinghouse Electric Company had loaded the first VVER-440 fuel assemblies at Loviisa Unit 2 during annual planned maintenance.

In previous years, Rosatom’s fuel division TVEL was the sole supplier of nuclear fuel to Loviisa. The last fuel contract was signed in 2006 when the NPP’s previous license was renewed. Following a tender, Fortum entered into an agreement with TVEL to supply fuel for Loviisa-1 reactors until 2027 and Loviisa-2 until 2030. Following the outbreak of the war in Ukraine, Fortum signed a contract with Westinghouse Electric Company in November 2022 to develop, license and produce alternative fuel for its VVER-440 reactors based on technologies developed in the 2000s by British Nuclear Fuels Limited, which owned Westinghouse Electric at the time.

Last year, the first test assembly, which does not contain real uranium pellets, was loaded into the Unit 2 reactor.

Let us remind that in September 2023, Westinghouse fuel assemblies for the VVER-440 reactor were loaded into Unit 2 at the Rivne NPP in Ukraine.

Commentary by Bellona:

«As one renowned politician of the USSR liked to say, the process has begun.

Although Loviisa-1 and Loviisa-2 have contracts with Russia’s TVEL through 2027 and 2030, respectively, Westinghouse has carried out the first loading of fuel into a Finnish VVER-440 reactor. Ukraine has also converted two of its VVER-440 reactors to Westinghouse fuel.

Thus, when it comes to fuel for VVER-440 reactors, there are three countries left in Europe (Hungary, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic) to which Russia’s TVEL still delivers fuel.  Additionally, by the end of 2024, the Dukovany NPP reactors will switch to Westinghouse fuel. The Slovaks also plan to switch to fuel manufactured by France’s Framatome or Westinghouse. The first deliveries are expected in 2027.  In addition, one VVER-440 reactor with fuel from TVEL continues to operate at the Armenian NPP, which is currently in the stage of resource extension. However, a strategic decision has now been made to build a new small modular nuclear power plant in the country by 2036, when the service life of the current NPP will be over.

Thus, practically all countries which operated Russian (Soviet) VVER-440 reactors, with the exception of Hungary, are moving away from using Russian TVEL fuel»

Orano plans to build enrichment plant in USA ↑

On September 4, Tennessee Governor Bill Lee announced that Orano USA had selected Oak Ridge as the preferred site for a new centrifuge uranium enrichment facility.

Orano announced plans to build the enrichment plant in March 2024. The project has been named Project IKE. It is anticipated that with the timely completion of required milestones, operations could begin in the early 2030s.

According to Orano USA CEO and president Jean-Luc Palayer, the company’s next steps will be to secure available federal support and customer commitments , obtain a license from the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission and approval from Orano’s board of directors.

Kozloduy NPP in Bulgaria exempted from EU sanction restrictions on Russia ↑

On September 18, the Bulgarian government approved a decision for exemption from EU sanctions on Russia (from certain provisions of Council Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 of 31 July, 2014) to allow the Kozloduy NPP to enter into public contracts with selected companies listed in the appendix to the decision (appendix is not available). In addition, imports of ferrous metallurgy products, other goods and technologies will be allowed, as well as the provision of relevant technical assistance from Russia in fulfillment of contracts also listed in the appendices to the decision.

The exemption will apply until the contracts expire. The explanation given is that a significant part of the systems and equipment of Units 5 and 6 of the Kozloduy NPP are of Russian manufacture, and so several contracts on goods and services for the annual repair, reliable and safe operation of these units are signed or planned to be signed with Russian contractors. This is the only way to ensure regular deliveries and consulting services by designers, constructors and manufacturers of the equipment installed at the plant.

This is not the first such decision by the Bulgarian government. In a decision of 22 March, 2023, the Council of Ministers granted the Kozloduy NPP a waiver of restrictions on imports of dual-use goods and technologies under a contract specified in the decision, and allowed imports of iron and steel, as well as other goods and related technical assistance under certain contracts until their expiration.

There is also a decision dating from 9 August, 2023, allowing the Kozloduy NPP to receive deliveries from Russian companies for scheduled annual repairs of Unit 6. This involves internal reactor detectors and induction motors, as well as related supplies and services, and a number of other spare parts.

One of the steam generators at Unit 6 of the Kozloduy NPP may need to be replaced, which has led to disagreements in the Bulgarian Parliament concerning the sale of equipment from the Belene NPP project to Ukraine, as the steam generators that are part of the deal are seen as the only alternative to purchasing the required equipment from Russia.

Commentary by Bellona:

«The strategic goal of countries that are looking for ways to move away from dependence on Rosatom structures is understandable and in Bellona’s opinion correct. However, these long-term and extensive technical and technological ties cannot be broken quickly and without losses. Especially if this is associated with nuclear and radiation risks.

Timely and complete maintenance of nuclear plants must be carried out thoroughly to avoid nuclear and radiation risks, even in a complex military-political and economic situation. Therefore, the Bulgarian government’s decision to suspend certain sanction restrictions on Russia looks justified. However, this does not mean that the strategic goals of moving away from dependence on Rosatom should change»

Events in the Russian nuclear sector and in Rosatom projects abroad

Rosatom publishes annual report for 2023 ↑

In September, Rosatom State Corporation published its public annual report for 2023 (report in Russian). According to the report, in 2023 consolidated revenue in the open section amounted to 2.6 trillion rubles, which is 45.6% more than the previous year’s figure (1.7 trillion rubles). The report notes that this growth was achieved mainly from increased revenue from the sale of transportation services, uranium products and enrichment services, purchased electricity and capacity, and other energy resources.

Taxes paid to budgets of all levels amounted to 443.1 billion rubles, which also exceeded the 2022 figure by 52%.

Revenue from foreign projects amounted to $16.4 billion (about 1.5 trillion rubles), which is 46.7% more than in 2022. (Rosatom head Alexei Likhachev already announced these sums in early 2024).

In his introduction to the report, Likhachev notes that Rosatom implements projects in over 60 countries. The portfolio of foreign orders for the ten-year period amounted to $127.1 billion.

Alexei Likhachev expects that in 2024 revenue will amount to at least 3 trillion rubles, and 570 billion rubles of taxes will be paid. He says growth will be ensured primarily due to new fields of activity and foreign projects.

This time the report contains more information about Rosatom’s activities in occupied Enerhodar, the satellite town of the Zaporizhzhia NPP.

In addition to “ensuring effective interaction with the IAEA on issues relating to the safety of Zaporizhzhia NPP”, which were also mentioned in the 2022 report, the new report states that Enerhodar has joined Rosatom’s “nuclear family”. In Enerhodar, Rosatom has launched the sector initiatives “Rosatom’s Territory of Culture” and “Rosatom’s School”, and opened an office of the Rosatom’s Public Council, which is intended to contribute to “maintaining social stability and harmony in the satellite town of the Zaporizhzhia NPP, and forming a positive image of the Russian Federation and the Rosatom State Corporation”.

We may also note that unlike the report for 2022, in this report the information on the number of Rosatom staff for each region includes the Zaporizhzhia Oblast, where 203 people were employed as of late 2023.

Commentary by Bellona:

«Rosatom’s report for 2023 is an interesting document for studying, analyzing and forecasting the development of the further situation of nuclear power use not only in Russia, but in other countries where Rosatom has projects and partners. Bellona is currently preparing a survey of the activity of the Russian nuclear sector in 2023 and 2024 which will provide this analysis»

Rosatom announces completion of clean-up of Soviet nuclear legacy in the Far East ↑

Rosatom representatives have announced the completion of the clean-up of the Soviet nuclear legacy in the Far East region.

According to Alexander Abramov, deputy director for state policy on radioactive waste, spent nuclear fuel and decommissioning of nuclear and radiation hazardous facilities at Rosatom, no spent nuclear fuel remains in the Far East, or hazardous objects that require scrapping in the water area.

Rosatom reported that in the Far East, 82 nuclear submarines decommissioned before 2022 have been scrapped. Special infrastructure has been created in Sysoyeva Bay for processing liquid radioactive waste, removing spent nuclear fuel (SNF) and treating radioactive waste. All accumulated SNF has been completely removed from the region. Radiation hazardous waste was also removed from the former onshore naval technical base in Krasheninnikov Bay, and work on decommissioning the facility has begun. The reactor compartments of the scrapped nuclear submarines were sent for storage to a long-term storage facility in Razboinik Bay (Cape Ustrichny).

Efforts to clean up nuclear materials and protect the marine and coastal environment over the past three decades have been supported by other countries, in particular Japan.

Commentary by Bellona:

«The Russian (USSR) Pacific Fleet did not have as many nuclear-powered ships and problematic onshore nuclear- and radiation-hazardous facilities as the Northern Fleet. But nevertheless, 10 years ago there were still around 12 decommissioned vessels that had yet to be scrapped in the Pacific – 5 nuclear submarines, 2 nuclear cruisers and 5 maintenance vessels. However, unlike for the Northern Fleet, virtually all of the spent nuclear fuel accumulated there was removed from Far Eastern shore bases and shipyard storage facilities to PO Mayak.

Nevertheless, the main nuclear- and radiation-hazardous objects of public concern in the Far East were the two nuclear submarines, K-314 and K-431, which had nuclear accidents in 1985.  On the K-431 Project 675 nuclear submarine, the accident occurred at the Navy’s ship repair yard in Chazhma Bay while reactor cores were being refueled. The K-314 Project 671 nuclear submarine suffered a severe accident with coolant loss, nuclear reactor dryout, partial melting of fuel rod casings and depressurization of the primary circuit through the casings of control rods in the port-side nuclear reactor, when the submarine was returning from combat service.

Until the end of 2011, both of these hazardous nuclear submarines were in floating storage in Pavlovsky Bay. In 2011, the submarines were cut into three sections. In 2009-2011, an isolation point for the submarines was built in Razboinik Bay, where reactor units K-314 and K-431 were placed in 2012. The isolation point has a planned service life of about 100 years, so it is quite obvious that the three reactor sections of the nuclear submarines are still in the isolation point, and the spent nuclear fuel is still in the reactors of these submarines.

Rosatom did not mention these submarines at all in its report, as they are not exactly anything to be proud of, and there is no point in alarming the public unnecessarily.

One final clarification: it is almost 100% certain that the two submarines described above (although there is no information about this) are still in Razboinik Bay. When Abramov says “in the Far East there are no more hazardous objects that require scrapping in the water area” (see above) he means objects that are afloat (in the water area)»

Rosatom projects abroad in brief ↑

Tianwan NPP, China. At power unit 8 the reactor shell was installed in final position, which was delivered to the construction site at the end of August.

Akkuyu NPP, Turkey. At Unit 1, the dome of the outer containment – its last element – was installed in the final position. Two hydraulic tanks of the emergency core cooling system (ECCS) were installed in the final position at Unit 2. Concreting of the turbine unit foundation was completed on Unit 3. On September 26, a delegation of Rosatom management headed by Director General Alexey Likhachev paid a working visit to the Akkuyu NPP construction site.

Rooppur NPP, Bangladesh. At Unit 1, 163 simulated fuel assemblies (copies of standard fuel assemblies without nuclear fuel) were loaded into the reactor vessel.

Meanwhile Bangladesh is continuing to experience difficulties with payments on a loan received from Russia to build the Rooppur NPP.

Before the outbreak of war in Ukraine, The Business Standard writes, Bangladesh regularly paid interest until the USA placed sanctions on Russian banks, making payment impossible, and led to interest and fines accumulating.

In April 2023, Russia and Bangladesh examined the possibility of payments on the loan in yuan through Chinese banks, but US sanctions hindered these plans, and payments in rubles are impossible under the current monetary policy of Bangladesh, which can only deal with the SDR currency of the International Monetary Fund.

In September, a source in the Bangladesh finance ministry told The Business Standard that despite having the fund ready for interest payments, a way to make the transfers had not yet been found due to problems with the payment channel and currency. In June, Bangladesh asked Russia to find alternative transaction methods to settle overdue interest, commitment fees and late fees. Earlier, Bangladesh suggested that instead of collecting dues, Russia should invest in new projects, the stock market, or purchase goods from Bangladesh.

Russia, in a letter to Bangladesh’s Department of Economic Relations dated 21 August, stated that such an option was unlikely and requested that the republic pay $630 million by 15 September in US dollars or yuan.

In early October, it was reported that about $809 million has accumulated in an escrow account in the Bank of Bangladesh, but there is still no way to make payments safely and smoothly.

Bangladesh is now negotiating with Russia for a two-year extension of the loan due to delays in the construction of the Rooppur nuclear power plant. Negotiations on this began back in the spring of 2024, the reasons for this request include the consequences of the Covid-19 pandemic, international sanctions that have affected direct transactions between Bangladesh and Russia and made it difficult to import equipment needed for construction, and delays in the construction of the power line necessary for the commercial operation of the NPP.

The current loan expires in December 2024, but failure to pay $630 million in interest and fines could result in additional fines and further complications, including in these negotiations.

Bolivia. Uranium One Group, an affiliated company of Rosatom, and the Bolivian state company YLB (Yacimientos de Litio Bolivianos) signed a contract to build an industrial complex for the manufacture of lithium carbonate. The project of the Russian company plans to launch an industrial facility in the second half of 2025 with subsequent gradual expansion of production capacities, reaching up to 14,000 tons of lithium carbonate a year.

El-Dabaa NPP, Egypt. On 26 September work began on assembling the internal protective shell of unit 2.

Separate extended commentary on a significant event of the month

68^TH IAEA General Conference ↑

In the second half of September the 68^th IAEA General Conference was held in Vienna. Bellona provides a survey of this event in the form of a separate extended comment by the head of the Bellona nuclear project Alexander Nikitin:

This was the third General Conference during the wartime period. Under the IAEA charter, the General Conference is attended by all IAEA members, and may discuss and take decisions on any issues relating to the IAEA’s mandate.

The plenary of the session discussed the report of the IAEA Director General “Nuclear safety, security and safeguards in Ukraine”, noting that:

• The situation at the ZNPP remains unstable, and all seven indispensable pillars of safety are compromised fully or partially;
• As of 30 August 2024, a total of 139 missions comprising 144 staff members had been deployed at all five NPP sites in Ukraine;
• IAEA missions still face restrictions in obtaining timely and appropriate access to all areas of relevance to nuclear safety, and in having open discussions with all relevant staff at the ZNPP;
• The IAEA has continued to provide technical support and assistance to Ukraine related to nuclear safety and security. In total, over €10.5 million worth of equipment has been delivered to 18 organizations in Ukraine since the start of the armed conflict.
• 30 member states and the EU have provided the IAEA with extrabudgetary contributions for assisting Ukraine in the area of nuclear safety, security and safeguards;
• As of September 2024, across various components of the comprehensive program for assistance, currently unmet funding needs to address identified priorities in various programs and maintain the same level of operations for the continued presence missions throughout the next year amount to approximately €23 million.

At the plenary meeting on September 20, the General Conference adopted another resolution on Ukraine. Recalling four resolutions by the IAEA Board of Governors and the previous resolution of the 2023 General Conference, as well as the UN Security Council resolution, it “expressed grave concern” that the Russian Federation “has not heeded” (i.e. ignored) all the previous calls of the IAEA and the UN, and called once more “for the urgent withdrawal of all unauthorized military and other personnel from Ukraine’s ZNPP, and for the plant to be immediately returned to the full control of the competent Ukrainian authorities” and reaffirmed “that Ukrainian nuclear power plants and installations… must operate… under full sovereign control of Ukraine.”

The resolution was passed by 65 votes to 8, with 43 abstaining. These figures drew a euphoric reaction from Mikhail Ulyanov, Russia’s Permanent Representative to the International Organizations in Vienna, as when the same resolution was adopted at the previous session, there were three more votes for it and four fewer against. Perhaps Ulyanov decided that this represented an excellent result and a great achievement on his part.

The General Conference gave the floor to the head of Rosatom, probably in the hope of getting some response to their appeals and admonishments. Likhachev began his speech by reminding the IAEA members and leadership that “the Soviet Union was involved in the creation of the IAEA,” that “we (Russia) … will support the Agency’s activities …, including with financial resources,” we “will continue to fulfill all our international obligations,” we “highly assess the IAEA’s contribution to the safety of the ZNPP,” but “the reckless behavior of the Kyiv regime poses a threat not only to individual facilities of the Russian nuclear power industry, but also to the development of the entire global nuclear industry.” “Let’s call things by their proper names,” Likhachev urged. And just in case, he also reminded his listeners that Russian President Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin keeps a close eye on what is happening in the nuclear industry, including all important anniversary events and commemorative dates.  The audience applauded his speech. And that was all.

At a session of the UN General Assembly in September 2024, a number of heads of state declared that the UN needs to be reformed.  UN structures such as the Security Council, the IAEA and others need to be reset or restructured, possibly with a new format, with new responsibilities, capabilities and resources.

This is a fair and timely demand, since the old international structures which should maintain world order and security are failing in their task, and for various reasons prove unable to respond to global changes taking place today, or to the aggressive actions of certain countries.