News
Publish date: October 7, 2024
News
Ensuring complete and reliable access to environmental information in Russia has never been fully guaranteed. Following the Russian invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, it became even more difficult. Some information ceased to be published altogether, such as daily oil production data and annual reports from certain industrial companies. Independent environmental organizations have been banned or closed.
The Arctic region plays a crucial role in comprehending the process of global climate change. Russia owns approximately one-third of its territory, including the exclusive economic zone of the Arctic Ocean. To understand and examine trends, we monitor new legislation, the plans of industry, the Northern Sea Route, international economic sanctions, accidents, and emergencies in the Russian Arctic, as well as provide commentary on the news. Subscribe to our mailing list to make sure you don’t miss the next digest.
Our previous monthly highlights for July can be found here.
Environmental and climate issues of the Arctic
1. By 2100, the Arctic Ocean’s CO2 absorption capacity will decrease by 14% due to melting permafrost
2. Svalbard glaciers melting five times faster than normal
3. Nearly 400 hazardous abandoned sites in the arctic are in need of cleanup
4. Russian Ministry of Natural Resources claims black carbon emissions from Arctic shipping don’t affect climate change
5. Scientists warn of declining goose populations due to climate change
Heightened industrial activity in the Russian Arctic
6. Yakutia approves mining development plan until 2035
7. Gazpromneft expands operations in the Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous region
8. Exploration of precious metal deposits begins in Chukotka
International situation in the Arctic and sanctions affecting Russian activities in the Arctic region
9. Norilsk Nickel entities face US sanctions for the first time
10. US Treasury adds tankers and companies linked to Arctic LNG 2 to sanctions list
11. Arctic LNG 2 project continues to expand production despite sanctions
12. Vessel Tracking Systems Detect Three Gas Carriers Exporting LNG from Arctic LNG 2
Northern Sea Route and shipping
13. Rosatom Developing “Great Northern Sea Route” Project from St. Petersburg to Vladivostok
14. 2,603 Voyages on the Northern Sea Route in Two Years Under GlavSevmorput Management
15. Russian Maritime Register of Shipping Introduces New Tools to Boost Arctic Shipping
16. Northern Sea Route Faces Most Difficult Ice Conditions in 30 Years
17. Putin Signs Decree to Establish Russian Maritime Collegium
18. Container Ships from China Arrive in Arkhangelsk via Northern Sea Route
Accidents and emergencies in the Russian Arctic
A new study by the Max Planck Institute for Meteorology, published in Nature Climate Change, highlights that the thermal erosion of coastlines across the Arctic is accelerating. This process releases organic matter from thawing permafrost into the ocean, disrupting the ocean’s carbon balance. These effects had not been factored into previous climate models.
The researchers examined how coastal erosion impacts the Arctic Ocean’s ability to absorb CO2 and predict that by 2100, this efficiency could drop by 7-14%.
NASA’s Landsat 8 satellite images reveal that glaciers in the Svalbard archipelago are melting at an abnormally rapid rate. Due to unusually high temperatures, July saw record levels of daily surface melting. On August 11, Longyearbyen recorded an unprecedented high temperature of 20.3°C for that month.
Professor Gemma Wadham from the University of Tromsø noted that Svalbard serves as an early warning system for climate change, signaling potential similar effects in other parts of the Arctic, where warming is occurring seven times faster than the global average.
The “Clean Arctic – Vostok-77” expedition has completed mapping abandoned Soviet-era industrial sites in the Arctic. In seven regions, 393 locations were identified as potential environmental hazards, including mines, airfields, and port facilities where equipment, machinery, and fuel and reagent tanks remain. Over 400,000 tons of metal structures and equipment from sea transport must be transported via the Northern Sea Route for proper disposal.
The Russian Ministry of Natural Resources has announced the establishment of a continuous monitoring system for black carbon emissions. Monitoring stations are currently operational in the Moscow, Arkhangelsk, and Murmansk regions, with a fourth added in the Nenets Autonomous Okrug in 2024. Plans are underway to expand the network to Yakutia and Krasnoyarsk Krai.
Despite this, the Ministry’s press service cites a recent study that claims the effects of black carbon emissions from Arctic shipping are regional and do not contribute to global climate change. According to the Ministry, switching from heavy to lighter fuels would not significantly reduce the climate impact, as most emissions do not reach ice or snow and instead settle in the sea.
The Institute of Geography at the Russian Academy of Sciences recently completed an expedition to Kolguyev Island in the Barents Sea, focused on studying the biogeographic effects of climate change on island ecosystems. The team observed that extreme weather conditions have worsened bird reproduction rates and increased mortality due to cold and exhaustion. Petr Glazov, the expedition leader and ornithologist at the Institute, warns that the conditions during this nesting season will likely cause a decline in goose populations, particularly the barnacle goose.
«Despite undeniable evidence of global climate change, Russian officials continue to dismiss its causes. In this case, we see an effort to justify the use of heavy marine fuel for ships navigating the Northern Sea Route. Citing an unnamed study, the Ministry of Natural Resources argues that black carbon emissions from Arctic shipping do not travel far, settle in the water, and have minimal impact on climate change. However, the Arctic Council, in which Russia was an active participant until 2022, asserts the opposite. As usual, Russian authorities seem to limit their environmental responsibilities in the Arctic to little more than waste collection.»
Aisen Nikolaev, the head of Yakutia, has approved a development plan for the mining industry in the republic’s northeast, which will be in effect until 2035. The initiative, titled “Development of the North-Eastern Mining Province”, covers five regions, including Ust-Yansky and Verkhoyansky, both of which are located in the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation.
Under the plan, gold production is projected to reach 31 tons by 2035, increasing Yakutia’s share of Russia’s total gold output from 37% to 50%. Additionally, silver production is expected to rise to 401 tons, tin to 3,000 tons, along with increases in other strategically important metals such as zinc, lead, tungsten, and rare earth elements.
On August 1, Gazpromneft-Noyabrskneftegaz announced the commencement of hydrocarbon production at the Novoye field in the Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Region. The field spans 371 km², with three production wells currently in operation. An additional seven wells are planned to be drilled by the end of 2024. The license for geological exploration and hydrocarbon production was obtained in 2022 at auction from the unallocated fund, and is valid for 25 years.
The company highlighted that the project was completed in record time. From the start of development to the final commissioning, only two years had passed – 1.5 times faster than the industry average.
On August 22, GazpronNeft announced the start of exploration at the Vostochno-Terelskaya group of fields in the Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Region. The company has secured licenses for three sites that will form part of a major oil production cluster in the region, with Gazpromneft-Noyabrskneftegaz serving as the project operator.
The Vostochno-Terel group of fields includes the Yuzhno-Kypakynsky, Kutymsky, and Yuzhno-Lensky sites, covering over 1,000 km² in southeastern Yamal. These sites are underexplored and highly remote, with the nearest year-round road located 105 km away. Equipment and machinery can only be transported via winter roads.
The press service of the Chukotka Autonomous Okrug has announced the start of geological exploration at the Peppenveem deposit, which is estimated to contain up to 61 tons of gold and 2,860 tons of silver. The exploration is being carried out by ArktikGeolDobycha, a resident company of the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation. So far, 12 wells have been drilled, totaling around 2,000 linear meters.
The prospects for industrial gold mining will be revealed in November, after which a work plan for the coming years will be developed. Next year, the company plans to explore six additional sites for which it has already obtained licenses.
«Despite Western sanctions targeting Russia’s mining industry, new oil and metal deposits, particularly gold, continue to be developed in the Russian Arctic. In the first five months of 2024, gold production increased by 6.2% compared to the same period in 2023, with further growth expected in the second half of the year.
It’s important to note that gold mining in Russia is highly polluting to water resources and is poorly regulated by environmental agencies. Furthermore, according to a RAND study, Russia uses gold to circumvent Western sanctions by purchasing foreign currency, weapons, and other goods.
Russia’s oil production has remained stable year-on-year, as have revenues from oil sales. Despite a slight decline toward the end of 2022, oil revenues have stabilized through 2023 and 2024. The European Union remains the third-largest importer of Russian oil globally.»
On August 23, the U.S. Treasury Department expanded its sanctions against Russia, targeting several companies linked to Norilsk Nickel, the largest Arctic polluter. Among those sanctioned are the Norilsk Mining and Metallurgical Plant named after A.P. Zavenyagin, mining company Bystrinskoye (located outside the Arctic zone in Zabaikalsky Krai), and various Norilsk Nickel service divisions, including Norilsk Nickel Sfera, Norilsk Nickel Repair, NN Technical Services, Norilsk Sputnik, Norilsk-Avia, Norilsk Support Complex, Norilsk Industrial Transport, Polar Construction Company, and the Gipronickel Institute, among others.
However, Norilsk Nickel’s core production and sales entities, such as PJSC MMC Norilsk Nickel, its Polar Division, subsidiaries, and Kola mining company and its divisions, were not included in the sanctions list.
On August 23, the U.S. Treasury Department added seven liquefied natural gas tankers connected to the Arctic LNG 2 project to its sanctions list: Asya Energy, Everest Energy, North Air, North Mountain, North Sky, North Way, and Pioneer. In June, media reports indicated that these tankers likely form part of the shadow fleet for the Arctic LNG 2 project.
Sanctions also targeted Novatek’s Chinese subsidiary, Novatek China Holdings, which is responsible for selling Russian LNG in China, including products from the Yamal LNG project. This marks the first indirect impact of sanctions on Yamal LNG.
Despite the sanctions, the Arctic LNG 2 project has continued ramping up production. Bloomberg reported that in July, in preparation for the launch of LNG exports, Arctic LNG 2 significantly increased its processing to 28.7 million cubic meters—3.5 times more than in June and the highest level in three months.
On August 16, the project delivered the second production line to the LNG plant at the Utrenneye field on the Gydan Peninsula. Bloomberg notes that this second production line is expected to begin operations by the end of the year. However, according to Kpler Insight, transportation of LNG from this line is unlikely to start before the summer of 2025, when the Northern Sea Route becomes accessible to non-ice-class vessels.
Russian news agency reported that the timeline for constructing the third and final production line of the Arctic LNG 2 project has been pushed back from late 2025 to 2028. Previously, in February, it was reported that work on the third line had been suspended, according to TotalEnergies, a former project partner. In June, Reuters also mentioned the possibility of scaling down the project to just two lines, with the third line potentially repurposed for a new project, Murmansk LNG.
Media reports suggest that Russia has begun using a shadow fleet to export gas from the Arctic LNG 2 plant. According to Bloomberg, three tankers loaded with liquefied natural gas were detected in August 2024. On August 1, satellite images showed the Pioneer tanker moored at the plant’s first line, followed by the Asya Energy tanker on August 10. On August 23, the Everest Energy tanker was reported heading towards the plant. Experts identified these vessels based on their size and deck structure.
Bloomberg further reports that these tankers obscured their true locations by falsifying AIS transponder signals, making it appear as though they were far from the Barents Sea. All three vessels are operated by Ocean Speedstar Solutions and fly the flag of Palau. However, on August 27, the Republic of Palau suspended their registration pending an investigation, following U.S. sanctions related to Russian LNG exports.
On August 26, the Pioneer tanker transferred LNG to the New Energy vessel north of the Suez Canal.
The Asya Energy reached southern Norwegian waters but, after news of U.S. sanctions and the suspension of its registration, it turned back to Murmansk.
By August 29, tracking systems showed the Everest Energy at the Saam FSU floating storage facility in the Murmansk region, likely offloading LNG. The vessel then returned to the Arctic LNG 2 plant, and on September 9, Bloomberg reported that it was heading to Asia via the Northern Sea Route. However, none of the three vessels—Pioneer, Asya Energy, or Everest Energy—are listed in the registry of permits to sail the Northern Sea Route.
«As long as there is global demand for the natural resources Russia exports, Russian authorities and companies will continue to find ways to bypass Western sanctions. While this does increase logistics time and costs, which slightly reduces overall profits, it is not enough to force the Russian government to reduce military spending.
However, this approach heightens environmental risks, as shadow fleets are often used to transport oil and gas. These vessels typically lack proper insurance and are not always suited to navigate the Northern Sea Route. Moreover, because they often conceal their true location, there is a risk that in the event of an accident, information about it may also be hidden.»
At the II Arctic – Regions Forum, held on August 8-9, 2024, a representative from Rosatom announced that preparations are underway for a federal project to develop the “Great Northern Sea Route”, following a directive from the President.
The proposed transport corridor will stretch from St. Petersburg and Kaliningrad to Vladivostok, covering approximately 8,000 nautical miles—5,000 nautical miles longer than the traditional Northern Sea Route. The reason for creating this extended route is that, under the Merchant Shipping Code, the NSR officially covers only the section from Novaya Zemlya to the Bering Strait. However, much of the cargo traffic begins and ends outside these limits.
On August 1, 2024, GlavSevmorput summarized the results of two years of operations since Rosatom took over its management in 2022. In this period, 2,603 voyages were completed, with over 2,300 icebreaker escorts and nearly 2,400 navigation permits issued. Rosatom emphasized that no emergencies have occurred on the route in the past two years.
On August 9, during the II Arctic – Regions Forum, a representative from the Russian Maritime Register of Shipping (RS) unveiled new tools for assessing and permitting vessels to operate in challenging ice conditions. RS has introduced “ice certificates” with mandatory “ice safety passports” as supplementary documents, even for vessels that do not have an ice class. As of early August, “ice passports” have been issued for a fleet with a combined deadweight of over 500,000 tons, 70% of which are for non-ice-class vessels.
These documents evaluate the operational efficiency of vessels in icy waters, allowing decisions to be made on whether to permit them to operate. RS justifies the need for these measures due to a shortage of the necessary tonnage and a lack of specialized ice-class vessels.
The western part of the Northern Sea Route, including the Kara Sea – previously not considered problematic – has recently experienced some of the most difficult ice conditions in 30 years. Challenging ice conditions have also been recorded in the East Siberian and Chukchi Seas, as well as in the Long Strait. This information was shared by Alexander Makarov, director of the Arctic and Antarctic Research Institute (AARI), at the II Arctic – Regions Forum in Arkhangelsk.
Makarov pointed to several factors contributing to the worsening ice situation, including climate change, which is leading to new ice phenomena. He also noted that the movement of large ships and icebreakers alters the structure of the ice, and the increasing size and power of vessels exacerbate the issue.
On August 13, Vladimir Putin signed a decree establishing the Russian Maritime Collegium, which will be led by Nikolai Patrushev, former Secretary of the Security Council and current assistant to the president.
The Collegium’s mission includes maintaining Russia’s status as a “great maritime power”, bolstering the country’s defense and security in the World Ocean, securing Russia’s access to global transport routes, and developing the Northern Sea Route as a key transport corridor. It will also focus on preventing marine pollution and preserving biological diversity. The Collegium will include councils dedicated to the strategic development of the Russian Navy, protecting national interests in the Arctic, and promoting Russia’s maritime activities. Additionally, the Security Council’s interdepartmental commission on Arctic national interests has been dissolved, with its responsibilities transferred to the Marine Collegium.
In August, the port of Arkhangelsk received two container ships from China, both traveling via the Northern Sea Route. The first ship, XIN XIN HAI 1, delivered 500 containers of auto parts, while the second, XIN XIN HAI 2, unloaded 515 containers of cars, auto parts, and clothing. Both vessels returned to China carrying Russian goods. A total of five such voyages are planned for the year.
According to the Centre for High North Logistics, a Norwegian foundation specializing in Arctic logistics solutions, 30 transit voyages have been made along the NSR in the first two months of summer-autumn navigation. The total cargo volume transported so far is estimated at 1.3 million tons, with 98% of the cargo moving from Russia to China.
«The Russian Arctic is facing further militarization and a push to increase shipping along the Northern Sea Route. This is highlighted by the creation of a new body closely tied to President Putin—the Marine Collegium. Its focus will be on strengthening the navy, expanding the NSR, and safeguarding Russia’s national interests in the Arctic. The previous Marine Collegium, which had existed under the Russian government since 2001, mainly addressed more “peaceful” issues like maritime shipping regulation and is apparently not equipped to meet the new ambitions for Russia’s Arctic expansion.
Meanwhile, transparency around the NSR is diminishing. Shadow tankers carrying oil and liquefied natural gas are navigating the NSR without appearing in the official records of the Main Directorate of the Northern Sea Route. Rosatom, the agency responsible for managing the NSR, has reported no emergency incidents in the past two years. However, this is one-sided information that cannot be independently verified due to the absence of independent oversight, public organizations, and open data.
Despite increasingly difficult ice conditions caused by climate change, permits are being granted for non-ice class vessels to operate along the NSR to boost traffic. This significantly raises the risks of emergencies under such challenging conditions.»
On August 2, oil spills and a strong odor were reported on the Solombalka River in Arkhangelsk, near the trawler fleet maintenance base. A few days later, on August 5, large fuel oil stains were discovered in the Kola Bay, near Retinsky in the Murmansk Region. Then, on August 11, during the refueling of a ship in the port of Murmansk, another fuel oil spill occurred, causing further pollution of the Kola Bay.
Kedr.media pointed out that 85% of the fine imposed on Norilsk Nickel for the 2020 accident did not make it to the Norilsk budget. This was due to local officials failing to allocate more than 19 billion rubles, despite Norilsk being one of the most environmentally vulnerable cities in Russia.
In addition, the Arbitration Court of Krasnoyarsk Krai reported that obligations to dispose of oil-contaminated waste following the 2020 diesel fuel spill in Norilsk were not met. Norilsk-Taimyr Energy Company (JSC) filed a lawsuit against Hydrotechnologies of Siberia LLC, accusing them of failing to properly sort and dispose of oil-contaminated soil. Instead, the company allegedly created an illegal waste dump at a technological site.
An accident aboard numerous Volgoneft oil tankers in the Kerch in mid December clearly show what can happen to aged ships when they are operated in bad weather—and when economic and military objectives are prioritized over the lives of crews and environmental safety.
In this news digest, we monitor events that impact the environment in the Russian Arctic. Our focus lies in identifying the factors that contribute to pollution and climate change.
A survey of events in the field of nuclear and radiation safety relating to Russia and Ukraine.
A visit last week by Vladimir Putin and a Kremlin entourage to Astana, Kazakhstan sought in part to put Rosatom, Russia’s state nuclear corporation, on good footing with local officials.