Supplies to Germany

On January 3, Spiegel newspaper, citing data from the Ministry for Environment, Energy, and Climate Protection of Lower Saxony, reported that “despite the war in Ukraine, at least 68.6 tons of uranium were imported from Russia to Germany in 2024, almost 70% more than in 2023.” According to the ministry, the material was supplied to the fuel element production plant owned by Advanced Nuclear Fuels (ANF) in the Lower Saxon town of Lingen. ANF is a subsidiary of the French company Framatome. The same day, this news was disseminated by the Russian state news agency TASS.

We have already extensively covered the Lingen plant and its crucial role in diversifying nuclear fuel supplies for European-based, Soviet-built VVER reactors in a recent article. At this Framatome plant, in cooperation with Rosatom, efforts are underway to establish licensed production of fuel for Soviet-designed VVER reactors, for which Rosatom is currently the main supplier, with Westinghouse being the only alternative Western supplier.

At the Lingen plant, like most nuclear fuel facilities globally, enriched uranium is used as raw material. It is then processed into fuel pellets, and subsequently into specially designed fuel rods and assemblies tailored to each type of nuclear reactor, which are then shipped as nuclear fuel to various nuclear power plant operators.

The Lingen plant has produced nuclear fuel for Western-designed reactors for many years. The sharp rise in supplies from Russia last year might raise concerns among the German and European public—and delight within Russian propaganda— but such fluctuations in the supply of these products are not uncommon.

However, the overall trend shows a decline in imports of enriched uranium from Russia to Germany (see chart). This is largely due to the closure of Germany’s last nuclear power plants in 2023. Nevertheless, the Lingen plant continues to supply fuel to foreign nuclear power plants. Moreover, the 68 tons of uranium supplied from Russia are sufficient to produce fuel for only 3-4 large reactors annually (there are about 100 in the EU), and for the Lingen plant itself—and these supplies account for only about a quarter of all its foreign raw material imports. Thus, the EU or specifically Germany cannot be said to have significant dependency on these Russian supplies.

Purchases by France, the EU, and the US

There is a broader trend that is even more interesting. Within the EU in 2024, low-enriched uranium from Russia was purchased primarily by French companies—about 30 tons were imported directly to France, and up to 70 tons were purchased by the French-owned plant in Germany. According to Eurostat data available as of January 7, 2025, total imports throughout the first 10 months of 2024 amounted to less than 100 tons of low-enriched uranium—less than half of the figure for 2023 (about 250 tons) and significantly lower than imports for 2022 and 2021, which ranged from 430 to 480 tons.

The share of Russiаn low-enriched uranium supplies to the EU dropped to 15% in 2024, compared to over 50% in some years before 2022. Other major importers of Russian low-enriched uranium in the past, such as the Netherlands and Sweden, ceased purchases from Russia back in 2022. Thus, while France remains almost the sole buyer of enriched uranium from Russia, it too has drastically reduced its purchases in recent years.

While 2024 data is still incomplete and Eurostat has not yet accounted for imports in November and December—which could slightly increase total imports from Russia for the year—it is unlikely that these two months will significantly change the overall trend. Europe is gradually reducing its reliance on Russian enriched uranium. Rosatom’s competitors, such as Urenco and Orano, are solidifying their hold on the European enrichment market and expanding their capacities.

A similar pattern is observed in the US, where, according to Comtrade international trade data, imports of enriched uranium from Russia amounted to only about 312 tons in the first nine months of 2024—less than half of the total imports from Russia in 2023 (over 700 tons).

Decline in Nuclear Fuel Supplies

A similar downward trend in the supplies of nuclear fuel for Soviet-designed VVER reactors, 19 of which operate in EU countries, was also observed in 2024. Bellona was one of the first to report last year that the EU significantly increased nuclear fuel purchases for VVER reactors from Russia in 2023, doubling them to stockpile against potential supply disruptions during the transition to new suppliers.

This growth is also explained by the increase in supplies of natural uranium enrichment services offered by Russia, which is reflected in the Euratom Supply Agency’s annual report for 2023, as these components were included in the supply of Russian fuels as a final product.

However, Eurostat data for the first 10 months of 2024 indicate that purchases of nuclear fuel declined again last year, almost halving to levels closer to the pre-2023 average of 300-360 tons. Given that all Russian nuclear fuel buyers in the EU signed contracts for alternative supplies last year, and some, like Bulgaria and Finland, have already begun using alternative fuel, new peaks in Russian nuclear fuel purchases are unlikely.

Conclusions and Forecasts

Although these figures are based on preliminary and incomplete data for 2023, we can conclude that the EU is gradually reducing its imports from Russia in the nuclear fuel sector. However, concerns remain over the pace of diversification and licensing issues at the Lingen plant.

Monitoring market dynamics in recent years and reviewing 2024 figures confirm our earlier predictions. When we consider current supply replacement contracts, we can surmise that by 2030, nuclear fuel imports from Russia to the EU may drop by at least 60% from 2022 levels—or below 100 tons annually. A similar forecast applies to uranium enrichment services. Moreover, when we account for plans announced by Urenco and Orano in the US and EU to expand capacities, Western countries will have ample opportunity to reduce their dependence on Russian uranium enrichment services by at least threefold over the next five years, to a level of less than 10% the total volume of purchases.