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Publish date: October 17, 1998
Written by: Jon Gauslaa
News
The Nikitin trial. Analysis of the indictment
Jon Gauslaa (b. 1962) is a lawyer with a special degree in international law from the University of Oslo, 1988. He has among other worked as advisor in the Norwegian Ministry of Justice (1990-97). He is currently legal advisor of the Bellona Foundation, and part-time lecturer at the University of Oslo. He has published several legal articles.
By Jon Gauslaa
On June 29, 1998, the Public Prosecutor of St. Petersburg levelled the indictment in the criminal case against environmentalist Aleksandr Nikitin. Except from a detailed description of the factual and evidential basis for the charges, the indictment is in total accordance with the charges that were proposed by the investigative body, the FSB (former KGB) on May 8, 1998, meaning that the latter document forms the judicial part of the indictment.
Thus, Nikitin is as before accused with high treason through handing over state secrets to a foreign organisation who engage in hostile activities with the purpose of undermining Russia’s outward security (article 275 of the Penal Code of the Russian Federation). Besides, he is accused with divulging of state secrets without signs of treason, but with serious consequences for the security of the Russian State (article 283 part 2).
These accusations are still solely based on the assumption that Nikitin during his work with chapter 8.2 and 2.3.3 of the Bellona-report “The Russian Northern Fleet – Sources of Radioactive contamination” (in the indictment named as “The Northern Fleet – Potential Risk of Radioactive Pollution of the Region”) has handed over to a foreign organisation information that according to Russian legislation is classified as state secrets. Nikitin is according to the indictment also accused with falsification of military travel documents (article 196 in the Penal Code of the RSFSR). [1] However, this part of the accusation against Nikitin was dismissed on September 16, 1998 by the judge appointed to preside over the case Judge Sergei Golets. It will therefore not be subject to further comments in this document.
The purpose with this document is to analyse whether the indictment is giving a legal and factual basis for the accusations that are brought against Mr. Nikitin, and even if some may say that this is to anticipate the conclusion: The answer is “no” on both points.
This analysis given below will among others show that the indictment is without any formal legal foundation (Section 2). Moreover, the judicial part of the indictment is a word by word repetition of previous charges that have been levelled by the FSB, except from the removal of all references to the secret and/or retroactive decrees that have been the legal basis for the case against Mr. Nikitin. He is therefore de facto accused of having violated these decrees, even if the Russian Constitution Art. 15 part 3 and Art. 54 forbid criminal prosecution on such a foundation (Section 3.1). This is also evident of the indictment’s more than 20 direct references to concrete provisions in the secret and/or retroactive decrees in its renderning of the expert evaluation that were carried out by the 8th Directorate of the Russian General Staff in May 1997. This expert evaluation forms the basis of the accusations against Nikitin. It is, however, invalid because it is entirely based on the secret and/or retroactive decrees which the expert-commission according to an order given by the Deputy General Prosectur of the Russian Federation on January 27, 1997, was not allowed using (Section 3.2).
A criminal case with such a foundation would be subject to dismissal in every country ruled by law. However, in Russia it has been brought to court, even if there also excist a number of other (subsidiary) grounds for dismissal. The indictment is among others far too general to be in accordance with the requirements in article 144 of the Criminal Procedure Code of the RSFSR (Section 4.1). Practically all information Nikitin is accused of having handed over to Bellona have earlier been published in open sources (Section 4.2), and an even lesser part of this information can be associated with the secret decrees’ listing of various kinds of secret information (Section 4.3). Furthermore, this information does not in any case pertain to the state secrets according to the Russian Federal Law on State Secrets from 1993 (Section 4.4).
The indictment also has significant errors concerning the usage of the provisions of the Penal Code. Provided that the above mentioned errors had not been done, the only logical step would be to qualify Nikitin’s action under its article 283 both when it comes to the information in chapter 8.2 and the information in chapter 2.3 (Section 5.1). The prosecution’s usage of article 275 of the Penal Code on the information in chapter 8.2 of the Bellona-report, there is absolutely no conformity between the factual and the legal foundation of the indictment (Section 5.2). Also the usage of article 283 part 2 on chapter 2.3 is out of touch with reality (Section 5.3). However, as there is no legal basis for these accusations in the first place, also this line of argumentation has only subsidiary significance.
It goes without saying that a criminal case in which the accusations are based on secret legislation used retroactively, not only has to lack a valid legal foundation. It also has to lack a valid factual foundation. After all, if the accusations had had a shred of the latter, it would not have been necessary for the prosecution to base them on an unconstitutional legal foundation. It therefore comes as no major surprice that a closer examination of the “evidence of Nikitin’s illegal activity” as they are presented in the indictment, shows that there excists no damning evidence. On the contrary “a total combination of the proofs in the case”, confirms beyond reasonable doubt that Nikitin has not done anything illegal during his work with the Bellona-report, and certainly not committed treason through espionage.
However, the actual examination of the evidence is not carried out in this document, as this is limited to the legal foundation of the indictment. Recommended reading for those who wants to go deeper into this side of the case, is Uggeruds “Evidence evaluation of the Nikitin-Indictment” (October 13, 1998), and my own “footnote-comments” to the indictment (October 20, 1998).
As indicated above, the main point in the indictment is that Nikitin supposedly have collected and handed over to a foreign organisation information, which according to Russian legislation is classified as state secrets. However, when Nikitin according to the indictment carried out his “illegal activities” (from May to September 1995) article 5 part 1 of the Russian Federal Law on State Secrets which now is the sole basis of the accusations, were worded as follows:
“The following information can be classified as state secrets: 1) Information within the military: … about tactical-technical characteristics and the possibilities of combat-usage of various kinds of armament and military technology.”
The word “can” means that article 5 before it was changed in October 1997, [2] was directed at Russian authorities containing a listing of information within various cathegories that they could classify as state secrets. The provision was not directed at Russian citizens containing a listing of allready classified information. It did itself not classify anything, as the classification as such should be carried out in accordance with the procedure described in article 9 of the Law, partly by presidential decree and partly by detailed departmental decrees. All charges that were levelled by the FSB untill May 8, 1998, f.i. June 17 and September 9, 1997 and February 24, 1998, accused Nikitin of having “handed over to a foreign organisation information classified as state secrets according to article 5 of the Federal Law on State Secrets, paragraphs 6 and 7 of the List of Information related to the State Secrets formalized by Presidential Decree dated November 30, 1995 No. 1203, and various paragraphs of the secret decrees No. 071:93 and 055:96 from the Ministry of Defence.” The reason is obviously that article 5 of the Law on State Secrets can not be used alone.
This is confirmed by the FSB’s answer February 24, 1998 to the petition filed by Nikitin’s defenders on January 15. In the summarizing of the defenders’ petition, the FSB states:
“The defenders choose to refer to the experts’ usage of the “invalid/illegal” Decree No. 071 dated September 7, 1993, … the lawyers also find the usage of decree 055 from August 10, 1996 and the decree from the Russian President 1203 from November 30, 1995 to be ”invalid/illegal” and in violaton of Article 54 of the Constitution…, but these decrees where introduced after Nikitin’s actions. If one follows the logic of the defenders, Russian Law has no normative documents that stipulate the level of secrecy of information. And there are no such documents that could be used in connection with an expert evaluation of the information that was collected by Nikitin and handed over to a foreign organisation. According to this logic, the experts would have nothing else to base their conclusion on than the Law on State Secrets.
This statement indicates that the FSB is aware of the fact that article 5 of the Law on State Secrets has to be supplemented with other normative acts. However, article 5 can not be supplemented with the decrees used by the FSB, as these are either secret (071:93), used retroactively (presidential decree 1203:95) or both secret and used retroactively (055:96). Usage of these decrees will therefore contradict either article 15 part 3 of the Russian Constitution which prohibits that anyone is prosecuted for violating regulations that is not officially published, or article 54 part 1 which prohibits retroactive usage of legislation that institutes or aggravates the responsibility of the individual. Consequently, the only normative act that according to the Russian Constitution can be used by the experts and the FSB, is the Federal Law on State Secrets, as this were both published and entered into force when the actions Nikitin is accused of committing took place.
To claim this is not ”legal nihilism … meaning that the state have no legitimate remedies to defend itself against attacks on its security”, as stated by the FSB in their rejection February 24, 1998. It is usage of a commonly recognized legal princible, which also is evident of article 15 part 1 of the Russian Constitution: Constitutional provisions have priority to provisions in Federal Law, presidential decrees and departmental decrees. It is therefore not the defenders, but the FSB who are the legal nihilists, as they place the provisions of secret departmental decrees over the regulations of the Constitution. However, because of interference from the General Prosecutor, cf. letter from A. Rozanov to Nikitin’s defenders dated April 21, and an instruction signed by prosecutor A. Gutsan in St. Petersburg on April 27, the FSB removed all references to the abovementioned decrees in the charges that were levelled on May 8, 1998. Also in the legal part of the indictment of June 29, 1998, which is identical with the FSB-document from May 8, all such references are removed.
Because of this, the indictment has on first sight an exterior varnish of legality, but as it accusations now only refer to article 5 in the law on State Secrets, they have from a legal point of view gone from bad to worse. Article 5 can not be used alone – it has to be supplemented with other provisions that both were officially published and in force in September 1995. The indictment do not have such a supplement, meaning that while the accusations against Nikitin previously had an unconstitutional legal foundation (secret decrees and decrees used retroactively), they now have absolutely no legal foundation at all.
To charge Nikitin with handing over information which is classified according to article 5 of the law on state secrets as it was worded in 1995 therefore violates article 54 part 2 of the Russian Constitution. It is here stated that no one can be “held liable for an action which was not recognized as an offense at the time of its commitment.” Only since October 9, 1997, when the amendments to the Law on State Secrets entered into force, has article 5 itself classified information within the cathegories mentioned in the article as state secrets. Thus, usage of article 5 in its new wording on actions that took place more than two years earlier, would violate the prohibition of retroactive usage of legislation in the Constitution’s article 54 part 1. The current indictment therefore fails to present legal grounds for prosecuting Nikitin for handling over alleged “secret information” to a foreign organisation.
Irrespective of which version of article 5 of the Law on State Secrets the indictment actually refers to, a conviction of Nikitin will either lack a valid legal foundation (if article 5 is used in its original form) or be based on legislation used retroactively (if article 5 is used in its new form). This will violate article 54 of the Constitution as well as a number of provisions in international treaties ratified by Russia. Among these provisions are:
These provisions have almost a simular wording, stating that “no one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a criminal offence under national or international law at the time when it was committed” (quoted from ECHR article 7). While UDHR is a political declaration, CCPR and ECHR are legally binding for Russia. The latter was ratified by the Russian State Duma in February 1998 and since May 5, 1998, when the ratification documents were deposited at the European Council, Russians have had the right to complain to the European Human Rights Court in Strasbourg.
Besides, it is evident of article 15 (4) of the Russian Constitution that “… the international treaties of the Russian Federation shall be a component part of its legal system. If an international treaty of the Russian Federation stipulates other rules than those stipulated by the law, the rules of the international treaty shall apply.” Provided that the Russian Courts are acting in accordance with the Constitution and the international treaties of the Russian Federation, it will not be necessary to bring the Nikitin case to Strasbourg. However, to act in accordance with these provisions the courts have to acquit Nikitin for violating article 275 and 283 part 2 of the Russian Penal Code, as these accusations are without legal foundation. Consequently, a conviction of Nikitin will violate the Russian Constitution and the treaties of the Russian Federation, and will not be worthy a country ruled by law.
As mentioned above, the only difference between the current indictment, and the earlier charges that have been levelled by the FSB, is that the references to the secret and retroactive decrees are removed from the judicial part of the indictment. However, the accusations in the indictment are still based on these decrees. This is among others evident of its description of what kind of secrets Nikitin supposedly has collected and handed over to Bellona, as this description clearly is based on phrases from various provisions in the secret decrees.
The indictment states in its judicial part that Nikitin has handed over information that constitutes state secrets concerning the accidents on the nuclear powered submarines K-27, K-140, K-222, K-123, K-131, K-192, K-208, K-447, K-508, K-209, K-210, K-216, K-316, K-462, K-38, K-37, K-371, K-367 and K-279. This is grounded with a reference to the expert group of the 8th Department of the Russian General Staff. On May 28, 1997 this group among others concluded that “the data on these submarines includes information on losses of armament and military equipment in times of peace, which …constitutes state secrets in the military field.” However, as article 5 part 1 of the Law on State Secrets has no provisions that give room for the classification of information on such losses, this statement is not based on article 5 part 1 of the Law, but on secret and/or retroactive decrees.
This is evident not only from a comparison of the various charges levelled by the FSB during the case (f.i. February 24 and May 8, 1998), but of the indictment itself:
The indictment lists in the section named “Nikitin’s actions in collecting data that constitutes state secrets are established by the following proofs:” among others up parts of the evidence in the case. It is here also referred to the conclusions from the various expert-groups within the 8th Department of the General Staff that have been assembled during the case to evaluate whether the Bellona-report contains secret information. According to the indictment, the expert group who concluded on Jan. 30, 1996, stated that chapter 8 of the Bellona-report contains information on “losses” of armament and military equipment in times of peach which constitutes state secrets, without giving the legal authority for this conclusion. The expert conclusion dated September 10, 1996, stated that such information constitutes state secret according to point 6 in decree 1203:95 from the Russian Preseident and point 242 in decree 071:93. Finally, the third expert conclusion dated May 28, 1997 stated that information on such losses constitutes state secrets according to pont 6 and 7 in the presidential decree, point 242 in decree 071:93, and points 275 and 582 in decree 055:96.
However, as emphazised above, article 5 part 1 of the law on State Secrets does not even indicate that information on such losses can be classified as state secrets. This part of the charges therefore lacks legal foundation, not only because of the reasons pointed out in Section 2 above, but also because the actual classification in the secret decrees goes beyond the limits for classification that are set by the Law on State Secrets.
Concerning these 19 submarines, Nikitin is also accused of having handed over “Information that discloses design faults, particularities of assembling and operation of domestic nuclear reactors onboard nuclear powered submarines, as well as information about opertation and utilization of nuclear powered submarines as weaponry and military machinery”. Also these formulations are based on secret and/or retroactive decrees (points 6 and 7 in the presidential decree, points 300, 317 and 612 in decree 071:93 and points 287 and 305 in decree 055:96). They are at least not taken from article 5 part 1 of the Law, as this only mentions “tactical-technical characteristics and the possibilities of combat-usage of various kinds of armament and military technology.” The indictment also states more specifically what kind of secrets Nikitin has handed over when it comes to the following six submarine accidents that are spoken of in the Bellona-report:
In addition to having revealed information concerning the abovementioned submarine accidents, Nikitin is also accused of in chapter 2.3.3 of the Bellona-report having disclosed information on the third generation of nuclear installations used on Russian submarines. According to the indictment this information reveals “information on technical characteristics of armament and military machinery and the utilization in the military shilpbuilding of new nuclear installations”. This phrase is, as the ones quoted above, derived from the secret and/or retroactive decrees and not from article 5 part 1 of the Law on State Secrets. Also this is evident of the indictment’s listing of proofes, where it among others is referred to the expert-conclusion from May 1997, where this information was considered secret according to point 6 and 7 in decree 1203:95 from the Russian President, point 287 and 612 in decree 071:93 and point 275 and 582 i decree 055:96 from the Ministry of Defence.
Thus the indictment is still entirely based on the secret and/or retroactive decrees. Even if the references to these decrees are removed from its judicial part, they are still evident of its factual part, where it in the rendering of the various expert conclusions actually is more than 20 direct references to various provisions in the abovmentioned decrees.
Thus, the order from the General Prosecutor of the Russian Federation has not been carried out in an appropriate manner, as it is here stated that it violates the Russian Constitution to base the accusations on normative acts “which not have been officially published…, or were published after the divulging of state secrets in question had occurred”. The indictment contradicts article 15 part 3, as well as article 54 part 1 of the Constitution. This means that the indictment have no valid legal foundation, and also contradicts a number of provisions of international treaties ratified by Russia. As pointed out in Section 2, the consequence of these fundamental errors is that the court has to aqcuit Nikitin of all charges.
The indictment’s judicial part is, as pointed out above, based on the conclusion from the expert group within the 8th Department of the Russian General Staff, dated May 28, 1997. This was the third expert-group to evaluate whether the Bellona-report contain any state secrets, and it was assembed because of an order issued by the General Prosecutor’s office on January 27, 1997. In this order, which is signed by Deputy General Prosecutor Mikhail Katushev, it is refered to earlier experts evaluation that were carried out by experts within the same body during 1995 and 1996 and pointed out:
”In accordance with article 15 part 3 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation and the ruling of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation of December 20, 1995, criminal prosecution for revelation of state secrets to a foreign country is only legal provided that the list over information that is state secrets has been published officially for general knowledge. There are no exemptions for persons who has such information which they got familiar with during their service. Consequently, the expert committees should have used in their expert evaluation the Russian Federal Law on State Secrets dated July 21, 1993 and ”List over information that is state secrets” enforced by Decree No. 1203 of November 30, 1995, by the president of the Russian Federation. But the latter normative act was introduced after the actions Nikitin is accused of committing took place, and can only be used after an evaluation of confirmed or aggravated responsibility compared with the former valid normative documents. During the extended investigation one has to conduct a new expert assessment and eliminate the violations presented …” (my italics).
This quotation shows that the expert evaluation was not supposed to be based on secret decrees, but on the Law on State Secrets supplemented with presidential decree 1203 if this did not confirm or aggravate responsibility comparded with former valid normative documents. However, instead of eliminating ”the violations presented [in Katushev’s resolution]”, the new experts started their evaluation with a ”legal analysis” in which they try to establish that it is not unconstitutional to use secret decrees as the basis for a criminal case. They claim that their usage of secret decrees is legal, because article 55 part 3 of the Constitution states that restrictions of the human rights and freedoms may be imposed “by federal law“. However, this argument does not hold water. Firstly, such restrictions have to be imposed by federal law, not by secret departmental decrees. Secondly, the possibility to restrict the human rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution, does only extent to the provisions in its chapter II ”Human Rights and Freedoms”, and not to the provisions in its chapter I ”The Basis of the Constitutional System”, where Article 15 part 3 is placed.
By trying to prove the legality of their usage of the decrees, the experts have not carried out the order given by the General Prosecutor’s office. The experts have by neglecting to fulful these orders also violated article 15 part 3 and 54 part 1 of the Constitution and ignored the ruling of the Constitutional Court of December 20, 1995. Thus their conclusion that chapter 2.3 and 8.2 of the Bellona-report contain state secret according to decree 071:93 and 055:96 from the Ministry of Defence can not be used as basis for the accusations against Nikitin.
However, this has not prevented the FSB from basing not only the current indictment, but also the charges that were levelled on June 17, 1997, September 9, 1997, February 24, 1998, and May 8, 1998on this expert evaluation. Instead of realizing the legal facts of the case, the FSB has stubbornly claimed that it will not violate the Constitution to charge Nikitin on the basis of the expert’s evaluation of the secret retroactive decrees. Their main argument, have been that the secret decrees are valid as such. However, when the FSB on February 24, 1998 in their rejection of the defenders’ petition, claims that it is ”impossible to accept the defenders’ conclusion on the ’invalidity’ of the secret decrees, because they are not published in the open press”, they fail to see that this is not only the conclusion of the defenders. This is also the conclusion in the order given by the Deputy General Prosecutor on January 27, 1997.
The FSB also fail to see that their arguments are without relevance for the constitutional question at stake. Even if the Constitution does not forbid to classify the decrees that contains the listings of various kinds of secret information, it forbids to use normative acts that have not been officially published as the basis for a criminal charge. This interpretation is confirmed by the ruling of the Constitutional Court on December 20, 1995, and it is agreed with by the General Proceratur’s office in their instructions dated April 27, 1998. In other words: If a state body choose to classify its listings of what kinds of information that is secret, as it according to article 9 part 5 of the Law on State Secret might do if it finds it suitable, it has to accept that such non-published listings can not be used as a basis for a criminal charge.
The decisive question in the criminal case is therefore not if the decrees are valid as such, but if they have been officially published. Decree 071:93 and 055:96 have not, and can therefore according to article 15 part 3 of the Constitution and the interpretation made by the Constitutional Court and the General Prosecutor, not be used as basis for the charges against Nikitin. However, as the current indictment is indeed based on an expert evalution that claims that he has violated secret and retroactive decrees, the indictment as such are invalid. The continued usage of secret decrees is a violation of a fundamental constitutional principle, which according to the division of the Russian Constitution belongs to the principles that form the very basis of the constitutional system. The experts’ usage of the secret decrees, is therefore in itself more than enough reason for dismissing the case, as this means that the indictment cbrought against Nikitin – as the seven previous charges– are not lawful.
Given these facts, the statement in the letter from the General Prosecutor’s office to the defenders dated April 21, 1998 that ”the charges against Nikitin for high treason, collecting and divulging of information that pertains to state secrets, are sustainable”, is highly misleading. These charges are founded on an expert evaluation based on the secret and retroactive decrees which according to the General Prosecutor can not be used as the basis for neither the expert evaluation (cf. the order from January 27, 1997) nor a criminal charge (cf. the letter dated April 21, and the instructions dated April 27, 1998). The only logical and lawful conclusion is therefore that the charges against Nikitin are not sustainable.
The background for the order from the General Prosecutor’s office dated January 27, 1997, to have a new expert evaluation of whether the Bellona-report contains state secrets, was not only that the previous experts had based their conclusion on secret decrees. They had also refused to compare the information in the report with the information in open sources. Also this refusal was heavily criticized in the order from the General Prosecutor’s office:
“Transfer of information which previously has been published in open sources is not a criminal offence according to article 64 of the Penal Code of the RSFSR [which later has been replaced by article 275 in the Penal Code of the RF]. Therefore the investigators and the experts had to not only asses the level of secrecy of the information delivered by Nikitin, but also to verify if this information had been published before. However, the question about the open sources was not studied by the experts at all, despite the fact that the documents in the case clearly show that they had this possibility. A similar study was carried out upon request from the investigator by experts in military unit No. 27177 (my italics).
<+could not have been obtained from open sources”, is founded on an inadequate basis. As a result of this, the indictment against Nikitin is still not based on a sufficient analysis of the open sources. In the case files, however, it exists such an analysis carried out by experts from military unit No. 27177 during the summer of 1997, on the request of investigator Osipenko. But this analysis does not fit with the spy-case the prosecution tries to construct. The indictment is therefore entirely based on the faulty analysis from the 8th Department of the General Staff, which in direct contradiction with the General Prosecutors’ order and the Russian Constitution is based on secret and retroactive decrees. This is a legal scandal, as the analysis from unit 27177 proves that practically all the information which Nikitin is accused of having handed over is taken from open sources, cf. Section 4.2. However, the indictment does not even mention this anaysis among the evidence in the case! The fact that this expert evaluation has not been used, show that the investigation has not been carried out in accordance with article 20 of the Criminal Procedure Code. It is here stated that the investigators, as well as the prosecutor and the court are obligated to carry out a ”complete and objective investigation of all circumstances of the case, to clarify both the facts that can be used as evidence in disadvantage of the accused and the facts that can be used as evidence in his favour”. As the responsible prosecuting authorities have been familiar with the existence and the contents of the analysis from unit 27177, they have not only failed to carry out the controll of the work of the investigating authorities they are obliged to carry out according to article 213 part 3 of the Criminal Procedure Code. They have also by levelling the indictment inherited this mistake and made it their own.
The analysis made by unit 27177 does indeed show that chapter 8.2 of the Bellona report brings some information that has not been published before. However, a comparison of this analysis with the conclusion from the expert committee from the 8th Department of the General Staff concerning what information that in their eyes are secret, shows that even with reference to the secret decrees, almost no “secrets” have been revealed. Concerning the accident on K-27 in 1968 only the following sentence has not been published before and are considered to be “secret”: “Simultaneously, gamma radiation in the reactor compartment increased to 150 R/h. Radioactive gases were released to the reactor compartment form the safety buffer tank”. According to the indictment Nikitin, by mentioning that the radiation level was 150 R/h and that the gases were released from a buffer tank, has transferred: <->
Also K-140 had an accident in 1968. The only new and “secret” information about this accident is that the “power [of the reactor] increased to 18 times its normal amount”. Here it is disclosed that the power increased with 18 times, and not “almost 20 times” as it is said in the open sources. [3] For this amplification Nikitin is accused of handing over:
K-222 had an accident at the shipyard in Severodvinsk in 1980. The experts from unit 27177 point out that the open sources [4] have no information on the facts that ”the submarine’s crew left for lunch leaving the factory personnel on board the vessel” and that ”power was sent through the safety rod mechanisms without the controls also being engaged”. However, according to the experts from the 8th Department, only the latter sentence contains secret information. The only ”secret” that have been revealed is in other words that it was not given power to the controll instruments. For this Nikitin is accused of having handed over:
According to unit 27177 the description in the open sources of the accident on K-123 in 1982 does not mention that the submarine was ”on duty in the Barents Sea”, that its reactor used ”liquid metal” and that the accident was caused ”by a leak in the steam generator”. The open sources neither have any information on the ”number of metall alloy thet leaked out as a result of the accident”, and on what was ”decided for the prospective usage of the submarine”. However, the experts have here been somewhat inaccurate, as they have failed to see that the open sources [5] give a more detailed description of both the reactor carrying liquid metal and the consequences of the accident. The only new information is therefore the location of the accident (the Barents Sea), and the quantity of metall alloy leaking out (approximately two tons). The experts of the 8th Department consider only the latter information as ”secret”. Still Nikitin is accused of having transferred:
In 1984 there was a fire on K-131 causing the death of 13 crew members. The only information on this accident that is considered as new and ”secret” is the following sentences: ”The cause of the accident was that the clothes of one of the crew members caught fire while he was working on some electrial equipment. The fire spread to the seventh compartment”.
For spreading this information Nikitin is accused of having handed over:
The accident on K-192 which got world wide attention due the video-shots of the submarine beeing towed into harbour in the summer of 1989, is more detailly described in the report than the other accidents. The following sentences are not found in the open sources: [6]
”At 22.45 the portside power plant operator noted that the pressure in the primary circuit had dropped. The same had also happened with the level in the voulume equaliser. It was discovered that the level of radiotivity increased on the first and second floor in the reactor compartment. … A small leak was found developing in an inaccessible zone under biological protection. … During the search for the leak on the starboard side a loose pipeline exploded and the level of radioactivity increased in the reactor compartment. Early on June 27, the emergency protection system was removed and the crew started to bail water on the reactor on the starboard side. The water was pumped into the sea. … Later the same day, because of an error committed by the crew, the cooling of the reactor on the starboard side stopped for two hours. As a result the core of the starboard reactor melted and floated to the surface”.
It is here given a superficial description of the accident, but also some of the open sources indicates what happened. See for instance Ølgaard, 1993, where it is said that the core of the reactor to some extent melted and floated to the surface. Besides, Nikitin did not get the information on the accident on K-192 from the secret books at Kuznetsov Naval Academy as it is claimed in the indictment. In 1989 when the accident happened, he was head of the Nuclear Safety Inspection of the Ministry of Defence, and had through this position first-hand knowledge to the details of the accident. However, for releasing this information, Nikitin is accused of espionage through transfering to a foreign organisation:
The other 13 submarines are as mentioned in Section 3.1, only named in two tables where it is evident that they have had certain incidents causing radiation discharge or other emergency-situations. K-508, K-279, K-210 and K-216 had incidents causing radiation discharge due to a ”leaky steam generator” in 1984, K-447 and K-209 in 1985 and K-316 in 1987. As the leaky steam generator occurred on seven submarines within a few years, one might assume that this was caused by a construction weakness, and that it is this information that is considered to be “secret”. The fact that there on K-462, K-38 and K-37 have been incidents due to”critical underspace leakage of primary circuit” both in 1984 and 1986, and that K-371 had the same problem in 1986, might give reason for a similar assumption.
To the extent this information is not evident from the open sources, the new information is – in addition to the mentioning of the incidents as such – that there have been problems with leaky steam generators and underspace leakages of the primary circuits, within certain submarine-classes. While the information on the 11 above mentioned submarines falls into a certain pattern, this is not the case with K-367, which had an ”automatic control break” in 1985, and K-208 (in the report named as TK-208) which had ”cleaning unit leakages” in 1986 and 1987. The revealed information concerning these two submarines, must therefore be the sole fact that the mentioned incidents actually have happened. For all 13 submarines, the accusation against Nikitin is that he has handed over:
Concerning the information in the report’s chapter 2.3 on the third generation reactors that were developed during the early 1970s, the experts from the 8th Department claim that the following sentences have not been published in open sources and cointain state secrets:
”The reactors were equipped with a cooling system which operated independently of the batteries and that started up automatically in the event of a power failure. … Emergency start equipment gave the possibility of controlling the state of the reactor at any level of poweer, even in near-critical situations. An automathic mechanism was installed on some of the control rods which in the events of power failure, would lower the reactor lid to its lovwest level, thus completely halting the reactors. This would also occur should the submareine campsice. …The main safety problems of the third generation reactors were problems with the main components, especially the reactor core, and keeping them properly cooled during operation.”
Also the open sources [7] have information on these circumstances and reactors of the third generation are described in details in the open literature. But Nikitin is accused of disclosing:
This survey of the expert evaluations show that hardly any of the information in chapter 8.2 and 2.3 of the Bellona-report has not been published before. Besides, a significant part of the information that are published for the first time is not ”new” in the sense that it previously has been unknown, as it only amplifies what earlier have been discussed in open sources. When the analysis from unit 27177 is compared with the analysis from the 8th Department, the extent of the text carrying ”new and secret” information is narrowed even further.
When one adds this ”new and secret” information together, the most adequate conclusion that the quantity of this information is so limited, that it from an ”qualitatively” point of view, mest be said that no new information of any significanca have been revealed, cf. Uggerud, ”Evidential Analysis”, October 13, 1998. Morover, as the experts considering the question of what actually constitutes state secrets have based their conclusions on the secret and/or retroactive decrees, their conclusions are anyway invalid as the foundation of the indictment, cf. Section 3 above.
As pointed out in the order from the General Prosecutor’s office on January 27, 1997, the experts should not have used the secret decrees, but the ”Russian Federal Law on State Secrets dated July 21, 1993, and ”List over information that is state secrets” enforced by Decree No. 1203 of November 30, 1995, by the president of the Russian Federation.” However, the latter was introduced more than two months after the actions Nikitin is accused of committing took place. It can therefore only be used if it not confirms or aggravates responsibility compared with former valid normative documents containing an enumeration of secret information that were both officially published and entered into force in September 1995. If such documents do not excist, only the Law on State Secrets remains.
However, as pointed out in Section 2, this law can not be used alone. At the crucial time its article 5 only contained a listing of various types of information that could be classified. As a result of this there are no legal basis for charging Nikitin for espionage and disclosure of state secrets, and the accusations against him therefore have to be dismissed.
It is therefore only of subsidiary interest to discuss whether the narrow pieces of ”new” information in chapter 8.2 of the Bellona report can be associated with the actual formulation in article 5 part 1 of the Law on State Secrets, stating that information ”on tactical-technical characteristics and the possibilities for combat-usage of various kinds of armament and military technology” can ble classified. However, as the accidents which the ”revealed information” is connected to, happened between 1968 and 1989, and neither the actual submarines nor the construction classes they belong to are serving in the Russian Navy today, the conclusion of such a discussion obviously would be ”no”.
The Law on State Secrets was changed in the autumn of 1997, and now declares that all information that fall under the cathegories listed up in article 5 is secret. If the information in the Bellona-report had been transferred after October 9, 1997, when the new legislation went into force, it could have been a question worthy some discussion whether the parts of this information that had not been published before, contains classified information according to the new legislation. However, the actions Nikitin is charged for, took place two years earlier, at a time when it only was evident of a secret decree what kinds of information that actually were classified. Besides, the fact that Russian legislators found it necessary to change the law and classify a lot of information that under the legislation in force before October 1997 could not be classified, shows that based on the range of the law on State Secrets in its original form, there were no secrets in the material Nikitin has contributed to in the Bellona-report.
This conclusion is furhter fortified by article 42, cf. article 41 part 3 of the Russian Constitution. These provisions give Russian citizens the right to ”reliable information” about the condition of the environment, and state that ”concealment by officials of facts and circumstances posing hazards to human life and health shall involve liability in conformity with federal law”. They are concretizised in article 7 of the Law on State Secrets, which forbids classification of information about”extraordinary incidents and accidents, and their consequences which threaten the safety and health of citizens”. Article 7 also forbids classification of information about ”the condition of the environment”. As chapter 8 of the Bellona-report deals with incidents and accidents on nuclear submarines, the information revealed in this chapter obviously is covered by article 7 and can not be classified.
The FSB claims in their rejection dated February 24, 1998 of the defenders’ petition, that there is no reason to assume that article 7 has been violated, because the ”juridical-ecological expert-committee, came to the unambiguous conclusion that the information handed over by Nikitin had absolutely no ecological relevance”. The ”expert-opinion” is in other words that information about disasters and accidents on nuclear submarines, which have led to the deaths of people, to people receiving radiation, to the scattering of radioactivity into the environment and to the contamination of the environment, are without ecological relevance. It goes without saying that this view is totally absurd. In their rejection, the FSB also claims that condidential information should not be treated in accordance with the regulations that gives Russian citizens right to information on questions of environmental and ecological importance, but “in accordance with the Law on State Secrets. However, if the information Nikitin is accused of having handed over is dealt with in accordance with this law, it can not be classified in the first place, because it is covered by article 7 of the Law on State Secrets.
The indictment are also too general to be in accordance with article 144 of the Russian Criminal Procedure Code, which among others requires that “the time, place, and other circumstances for the criminal act” [8] shall be rendered to the degree it is possible from the material in the case. In the order dated January 27, 1997, the General Prosecutor’s office emphazises that the earlier charges had violated this provision, because “they did not concretize the level of secrecy” of the information in chapter 8.2 and 2.3 of the report. Such a concretizing has not yet been done. Besides, the indictment does not clearly state whether Nikitin is accused with handing over secrets concerning 21 or 19 submarine-accidents.
The indictment claims that he at the Kuznetsov Naval Academy in St. Petersburg in August 1995 copied information of accidents on 21 submarines from secret books ”with the aim” to transfer it to Bellona, and that this information according to the experts contains state secrets. However, the information about the accidents on K-320 and K-306 were not included in the Bellona-report. According to the FSB-document “Resolution on changing of the indictment” dated February 24, 1998 the charges connected with these accidents are therefore dismissed due to lack of evidence for the handing over of information actually taking place. Even if this is not evident of the indictment that were levelled on June 29, 1998, the accusation of treason seems therefore now to be connected with 19 submarine accidents that are mentioned in chapter 8.2 of the Bellona-report. However, only six of these 19 accidents are spoken of in the report (K-27, K-140, K-222, K-123, K-131 and K-192). The other 13 (K-208, K-279, K-447, K-508, K-209, K-210, K-216, K-316, K-462, K-38, K-37, K-371 and K-367) are only named in two tables of which it is evident that there have been certain incidents on these vessels that have caused radiation discharge or other emergency situations.
For having transferred information on these accidents to ”a foreign organisation who engage in hostile activies to undermine the outward security of the Russian State”, Nikitin is charged with violating article 275 of the Penal Code of the RF. However, as pointed out in the General Prosecutor’s order from January 27, 1997, transfer of information that allready have been published in open sources ”is not a criminal offence” according to this provision. To concretizise the accusations in an appropriate manner, the indicment would therefore have to compare the Bellona-report with the open sources and specify the which information in the report that have not been published before, and then specify what parts of this information that is secret. Because both kinds of specification are absent from the indictment, it is still far too general to be in accordance with article 144 of the Russian Criminal Prosecution Code.
Nikitin is not only charged with violating article 275 of the Penal Code by handing over the information about 19 of the submarine accidents that are mentioned in chapter 8.2 of the Bellona-report to a foreign organisation. He is also, in connection with the information in the report’s chapter 2.3 concerning nuclear naval reactors of the third generation, charged with violation article 283 by divulging of state secrets without signs of treason. The basis for this distinction is that Nikitin according to the indictments got access to the information on the submarine accidents from secret books at the Kuznetsov Naval Academy, while he got access to the information on the reactors of the third generation during his period of service. However, this distinction is highly artificial, as one and the same person not can be a traitor in one moment and not in the next. It therefore comes as no surprice that it in the instructions from the General Prosecutor’s office dated April 27, 1998 is pointed out:
“On the basis of the available evidence in the case, it is necessary to consider whether Nikitin’s actions concerning handing over state secrets to a foreign organisiation, regardless the source of the secrets, should be qualified under one provision in the Penal Code” (my italics).
<->This instruction could have been clearer, as it do not point out which provision the various sets of “actions” committed by Nikitin should be qualified under. But it does not say that both should be qualified as high treason through espionage (article 64 of the Penal Code of the RSFSR, cf. article 275 of the Penal Code of the RF.) It is an equally adjacent interpretation that Nikitin’s actions should be qualified as divulging of state secrets without signs of treason (article 75 in the Penal Code of the RSFSR, cf. article 283 of the Penal Code of the RF). However, the FSB has choosed the first interpretation and gives in and announcment dated May 8, 1998 the following reason for not to fulfil the instruction: <->
“From the materials of the criminal case it is evident that the secret information on the nuclear installations of the third generation which is published by Nikitin in the report, had become familiar to him during his service in the USSR (Russian) Navy. It is established that he handed over state secrets in May 1995. However, article 64 of the Penal Code of the RSFSR, which was in force at that time considered only handing over state secrets to a foreign state, not to a foreign organisation, as high treason. That is why these actions of Nikitin is qualified … as divulging of state secrets in accordance with respectively article 75 part 2 of the Penal Code of the RSFSR and article 283 part 2 of the Penal Code of the RF. Thus, according to the available evidence in the case and the Penal Code of the RF in force, there is no reason to qualify Nikitin’s handing over state secrets on the nuclear reactor installations of the third generation under article 275 of the Penal Code of the RF” (my italics).
This conclusion has no logic, as the only possible logical conclusion of the argumentation that is given would be to qualify all Nikitin’s actions under article 283. The FSB claims that the divulging of state secrets connected with the third generation reactors has to be qualified under article 283 of the Penal Code of the RF because it happened in May 1995. At this time article 64 of the Penal Code of the RSFSR was in force and did not consider handing over state secrets to a foreign organisation as treason. However, according to the indictment, the handing over of state secrets connected with the accidents on the 19 submarines to a foreign organisation took place in September 1995. Also at this time was article 64 in force and did not consider handing over state secrets to a foreign organisation as treason. To act in accordance with their own reasoning, the FSB therefore should have qualified both sets of actions under article 283 of the Penal Code of the RF.
Morover, according to the FSB article 275 of the new Penal Code actually introduces “handing over state secrets to a foreign organisation” as high treason, as article 64 of the old Penal Code only covered handing over state secrets to a foreign state. Thus, article 275 of the new Code which entered into force on January 1, 1997, fifteen months after Nikitin’ alleged handing over, is used retroactivily in disfavour of the defendant. That violates both Article 54 of the Russian Constitution, Article 7 of the European Convention on Human Rights and Article 10 of the Russian Penal Code of 1996, which amongt others states: “..when the Penal Code … aggravates the situation for the defendant, it has no retroactive force”.
After Nikitin’s release from custody on December 14, 1996, Deputy General Prosecutor Katushev stated publicly that he saw no hints of espionage in the case. Almost two years later, he is however facing trial on an accusation of espionage, even if the investegation has brought no new elements into the case. To be able to maintain this accusation during 1997 and 1998, references to secret decrees have been put in and out of the various charges, before the FSB on May 8, 1998 removed the number-references to the decrees, but maintained all text-references. Moreover, a closer examination of the indictment dated June 29, 1998 shows that this document has around 20 direct references to secret and retroactive regulations.
The factual basis of the espionage-accusation have during the whole period been that Nikitin on August 8, 1995, got entrance to the Kuznetsov Naval Academy and there looked through secret books which describe accidents on nuclear submarines. Some of the information in these books was supposedly written down and later transferred to chapter 8.2 of the Bellona-report. When Nikitin on this foundation is risking a minimum penalty of 12 years in prison, there is a severe lack of conformity between the factual basis of the accusation and the provision FSB has used. To charge Nikitin for espionage is to shoot far beyond the target, as no spy in his right mind would first get himself access to secret information, and then actually turn himself in by releasing a book where this secret information is published.
Nikitin had as mentioned above, for several years a high position in the Nuclear Safety Inspection of the Russian Ministry of Defence. An important part of this work was to teach new cadets about the causes of earlier incidents and accidents on nuclear powered submarines. These facts show that he did not have to go to any library to get hold of information on these matters. However, the FSB has in their investigation ignored this possibility, and all possible evidence in Nikitin’s favour is systemetically left out of the indicment. This demonstrates the lack of objectivity that has characterized the work of responsible investigative and prosecuting authorities in this case.
Morover, to get Nikitin convicted for espionage, the prosecutions must prove that his intention was to “undermine the sovereignity, territorial inviolability, national security or means of defense” of the Russian State, cf. article 64 of the Penal Code of the RSFSR. This provision was on January 1, 1997 replaced by article 275 of the Penal Code of the RF. The latter provision do not actually say that the accused person’s intention must have been as described in article 64, as long as the secrets have been delivered to “a foreign … organisation or one of their representatives who engage in hostile activities with the purpose of undermining Russia’s outward security”. However, as article 64 was the provision in force at the crucial time, it is Nikitin’s own intention that is the decisive point, and it will obviously be impossible to prove that he had the intention described in this provision.
It might be added that the organisation Nikitin has co-operated with is the Norwegian environmental organisation “Bellona”. When Nikitin’s actions concerning the 19 submarines are qualified under article 275, the FSB in other words also accuses Bellona of engaging “in hostile activities with the purpose of undermining Russia’s outward security”. This is not openly said in the indictment, but it is evident of other case-documents.
In the rejection February 24, 1998 of the defender’s petition, for instance, the FSB claims that the citizens’ rights concering the protection of the environment and the right to access information, ”have not been the basis for the activity on Russian territory that have been performed by Bellona (who pass themselves on as an ecological organisation) and by Nikitin himself.” In other documents it is hinted that Bellona is a spy organisation because its office according to information collected by Russian Foreign Intelligence “is located in the street ‘Grünerløkka’ in Oslo, in the same building as the Norwegian Military Intelligence” (NMI). This information is entirely wrong. Grunerløkka is not the name of a street, but a part of Oslo. Bellona’s office was until recently located at Fossveien No. 19, in a building used only by the organisation itself, while the NMI was located several kilometers away. The building was before Bellona moved in there in 1994 used by the institution FAFO, which not denotes an intelligence organisation, but the Research Center of the Norwegian Trade Union.
This shows that the accusations against Nikitin (and Bellona) have no foundation in reality. They also contradict what have been said from official Russian representatives when the question of their view on Bellona’s activites has been raised. During his visit in Norway in 1996 President Jeltsin said that Russian authorities have no complaints against Bellona. Head of FSB, N. Kovaliov stated in December 1996 and February 1997 that ”Bellona can not be accused for anything, they only ordered an ecological report.” And in February 1998 Deputy Foreign Minister A. Avdeev in his answer to the demarche raised by the Troika Ambassadors of the European Union, claimed that the Nikitin case ”did not affect Russian respect for the activities of Bellona.”
But nevertheless, the FSB and their henchmen within the prosecuting authorities in St. Petersburg, states that the activities of Bellona on Russian territory are illegal and not based on the rights given by the Russian Constitution and Federal Law. And Nikitin is still accused of handing over state secrets to a foreign organisation who engage in hostile activites with the purpose of undermining Russia’s outward security. However, these accusations are a result of the FSB’s inobjective investigation. If the qualification of Nikitin’s actions was changed from article 275 to article 283 part 1 of the Penal Code (disclosure of state secrets without signs of treason and without serious consequenses for the security of the State), the difference between the reality and the accusation against would somewhat diminish. But nor such an accusation can lead to a conviction, as it still will lack a valid legal foundation (Section 2), it will de facto be based on secret and retroactive legislation (Section 3) and no secrets have been revealed whatsoever (Section 4).
5.3 The usage of article 283 part 2
Nikitin is also accused of violating article 283 part 2 of the Penal Code, by disclosing state secrets without signs of treason. This is based on an assumption from the experts from the 8th Department of the General Staff that the description of nuclear naval reactors of the third generation in chapter 2.3 of the Bellona-report, contains secrets information about “technical characteristics of armament and military machinery, and utilization in the military shipbuilding of new nuclear installations”. However, as the development of third generation reactors began in the early 1970s, one can hardly talk about “new nuclear installations”. Besides, the conclusion of the 8th Department contradicts with the view of the experts from the Russian Ministry of Nuclear Energy (Minatom), who in September 1996 concluded that chapter 2.3.3 contained no state secrets. This shows that the FSB again has overlooked evidence in Nikitin’s favour, and the expert conclusion from Minatom is not mentioned in the indictment.
Article 283 has two alternatives of punishment. “Ordinary disclosure” can be punished with imprisonment up to four years, but if the disclosure has had “serious consequenses” the punishment is prison from three to seven years. Nikitin is charged with violating the latter alternative. The foundation for this is the conclusion of an expert commision set up on September 17, 1996 to evaluate how much damage to the security of the state that was caused by the Bellona-report. The commision consisted of people from military unit No. 30895 and forwarded their conclusion only two days later. The damage was estimated to 4.500.000.000 rubles (before the denomination on January 1, 1998), or approximately 900.000 US dollars.
However, this conclusion was not related to chapter 2.3 of the Bellona-report. The experts’ calculation of the assumed damage is “based on the posibility for carrying out nuclear terrorism, a threath that is potential in present and the future times of peace. Spreading of reliable information on temporary storage spaces and storage of nuclear fuel, nuclear waste and used nuclear fuel produces a genuine possibility for sabotage of at least one storage space. Summing up: The inserted damage is calculated on the basis of the damage of such an accident.” This expert evaluation has in other words no connection with chapter 2.3. Besides, taking the actual amount into consideration it is in any case absurd to claim that the “disclosure” has had serious consequenses for the security of the Russian State. One could under no circumstance talk of anything more than disclosure without such consequences, but as it is shown above, there are no valid legal foundation for this accusation.
In the order issued by the General Prosecutor’s office on January 27, 1997 it is stated that “the case was sent to the court too early. There are a series of significant errors; the charges are not concrete and norms have been used in contradiction with the Russian Constitution.” And the FSB was given “not less than two months” to eliminate these errors. Also in the instruction given by the General Prosecutor at April 27, 1998 it is refered to “essential errors”. However, none of these errors have yet been eliminated. Moreover, new and significant errors have been committed, and the indictment do not only violate the Russian Constitution and the Criminal Procedure Code, but also a number of the provisions laid down in international treaties ratified by the Russian Federation. The discussion above shows that:
Morover, the analysis of the factual “evidence” that partly are carried out by Uggerud in his “Evidence evaluation of the Nikitin-Indictment” (October 13, 1998), and my own “footnote-comments” to the indictment (October 20, 1998), shows that:
Consequently, if Nikitin is convicted on the basis of the current indictment, he will have been convicted without a legal and factual foundation, for violating secret and retroactive legislation that he never has been given the possibility to familiarize himself with. And thus beeing deprived of the right to a proper defence in contradiction with article 123 part 3 of the Russian Constitution and article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).
This would be an extremely serious violation of fundamental principles of legal protection, based on the respect for the individual’s possibility to predetermine his legal status, not be imprisoned on an arbitrary basis, and be given a genuine chance to defend himself against any criminal charge. The Russian Constitution does on paper take care of these principles, and so do the internation treaties of the Russian Federation, of which ECHR is the most significant. A conviction of Nikitin on the basis of the current indictment would, however, mean a complete neglecting of these principles.
It is from time to time indicated that the City Court instead of reaching a verdict, will send the case back “for further investigation”, on the grounding that the prosecution has not prepared the case properly before sending it to court. Such a decission would, however, be pointless (the case has been going on for three years and the prosecution has not managed – and they never will – to come up with an indictment with a tenable factual and judicial foundation. Besides, it would also be unlawful, as it would both violate Nikitin’s constitutional right to have the charges against him settled by a court of justice (article 47, cf. article 46), and the Russian Fedration’s obligation under international law to end a criminal case within reasonable time (ECHR article 6, cf. the International Covenant on Political and Civil Rights, article 14).
Thus, the City Court of St. Petersburg has no other lawful alternative than to acquit Nikitin of all charges.
[1] The Penal Code of the RSFSR was on January 1, 1997 replaced by the Penal Code of the RF. However, the charges against Nikitin remain unchanged when it comes to the travel documents. Article 327 is the actual article in the new Penal Code that correspondends to article 196 in the RSFSR-Code.
[2] The amandments to the law on State Secrets were addopted by the Russian State Duma on September 19, signed by president Jeltsin on October 6, and entered into force when beeing published on October 9, 1997.
[3] Osipenko l.G, Zhiltsov L. and Mormul N: Atomnaja Podvonaja Epopeja, 1994.
[4] Ibid.
[5] Osipenko l.G, Zhiltsov L. and Mormul N: Atomnaja Podvonaja Epopeja, 1994, Ølgaard, P.L, Nuclear Ship Accidents, description and analysis, 1993 and Mormul N, Atomnye podvodnye lodki Rossii, 1995.
[6] Eco-Planet No. 40:1991; Morskoy sbornik No. 10:1992; Sobesednik No. 14:1991; Osipenko a.o., 1994; Ølgaard, 1993; Krasnaja Zvezda, July 1989; Backe S, The Accident of the Soviet Echo-II Class Submarine, …, 1989; Nilsen T, The Accident on theSubmarine K-192, 1995; Yablakov A., Facts and problems related to radioactive waste disposals in seas adjacent to the territory of the Russian Federation, 1993; Shmakov R, Problems in Decommissioning Nuclear Submarines and the Protection of the Environment in the Arctic Regions, 1995.
[7] Atomnaya Energiya 4:93 and 6:94.
[8] This provision actually deals with the preliminary charges (of which the FSB in the Nikitin case has brought forward no less than seven), but the same conditions do obviously apply for the indictment, as the judicial part of this document is word by word identical with the seventh and last set of charges.
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