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Publish date: January 7, 2025
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Ensuring complete and reliable access to environmental information in Russia has never been fully guaranteed. Following the Russian invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, it became even more difficult. Some information ceased to be published altogether, such as daily oil production data and annual reports from certain industrial companies. Independent environmental organizations have been banned or closed.
The Arctic region plays a crucial role in comprehending the process of global climate change. Russia owns approximately one-third of its territory, including the exclusive economic zone of the Arctic Ocean. To understand and examine trends, we monitor new legislation, the plans of industry, the Northern Sea Route, international economic sanctions, accidents, and emergencies in the Russian Arctic, as well as provide commentary on the news. Subscribe to our mailing list to make sure you don’t miss the next digest.
Our previous monthly highlights for October can be found here.
NORTHERN SEA ROUTE AND SHIPPING
1. Northern Sea Route Navigation Results for 2024
2. Digital Ecosystem for the Northern Sea Route Planned by 2025
3. Norilsk Nickel to Double Cargo Transport Along the Northern Sea Route by 2028-2030
4. Russia Lacks Sufficient Satellites for Comprehensive Ice Monitoring on the Northern Sea Route
5. Nuclear Icebreaker Chukotka Launched
6. Zvezda Shipyard Delays Delivery of First Arc7 Gas Carriers
7. Maintaining Arctic Control Highlighted as Maritime Policy Priority
8. Russia and China Hold First Subcommission Meeting on Northern Sea Route Cooperation
INTERNATIONAL SITUATION IN THE ARCTIC AND SANCTIONS AFFECTING RUSSIAN ACTIVITIES IN THE ARCTIC REGION
9. NOVATEK Continues to Cut Production at Arctic LNG 2
10. LNG Plant Operations in Russia Grind to a Halt
11. Britain Sanctions Tankers Carrying Russian Oil
12. Mitsui OSK Lines Warns of Delivery Risks for Arctic LNG 2 Gas Carriers
13. Italian Companies Circumvent Sanctions to Supply Equipment to Arctic LNG 2
14. France Records Highest Russian LNG Imports in 2024
HEIGHTENED INDUSTRIAL ACTIVITY IN THE RUSSIAN ARCTIC
15. Rosatom Announced the Expansion of Rare Earth Metal Production at Karnasurt Mine
16. Vladimir Putin Directs Measures to Reduce Loan Costs for Arctic and Far East Projects
17. Major Oil and Gas Companies Granted Control Over Information Disclosure
18. Gazprom Neft Supports Norilsk Nickel in Boosting Gas Production at SeveroSoleninskoye Field
19. Russia Reduces Tax on Hard-to-Recover Gas in Yamal to Zero
20. Norilsk Nickel Chooses Site for Copper Smelter in China
ENVIRONMENTAL AND CLIMATE ISSUES OF THE ARCTIC
21. Violations in Oil Field Operations Uncovered in Komi
22. Scientists Warn of Giant Viruses in the Arctic
23. Mesyatsev Island on Franz Josef Land in the Arctic has melted
24. Scientists report high levels of air pollution in Northwestern Russia
ACCIDENTS AND INCIDENTS IN THE NORTHERN SEA ROUTE
On November 13, Vladimir Panov, Rosatom’s Arctic representative, presented the preliminary results of navigation along the Northern Sea Route (NSR) for 2024. According to his report, cargo traffic on the NSR reached 37.6 million tons, slightly exceeding the 2023 figure of 36.25 million tons. Transit cargo volume along the route saw a 43% increase, rising to 3.08 million tons compared to 2.1 million tons in 2023.
Panov attributed this growth to increased shipments by PAO NOVATEK and the redirection of cargo from St. Petersburg and Murmansk away from the Suez Canal to the NSR. This redirection added approximately 900,000 tons of cargo during the summer and autumn seasons.
Svyatoslav Stepchenkov, Deputy Director General of GlavSevmorput, reported issuing 1,223 navigation permits for the NSR in 2024. As of November 15, 87 vessels were operating in Arctic waters. Sergey Zybko, General Director of GlavSevmorput, highlighted the steady increase in vessel traffic: 368 ships used the route in 2022, 453 in 2023, and 469 in 2024. Despite more challenging ice conditions in the summer of 2024, the average vessel speed along the route improved from 9.8 knots in 2023 to 10.6 knots in 2024.
At the port of Pevek, navigation concluded later than usual due to a storm that disrupted operations in late October. Consequently, the Arc7-class vessel Talnakh departed on November 27, becoming the last vessel of the navigation season.
On November 2, at the “Arctic – the Territory of Digitalization” conference, Anton Lutsyk, a representative of Atomflot, announced plans to implement a digital ecosystem for the NSR by 2025. Development of the system has been underway since 2021.
The new ecosystem aims to automate the selection of optimal ship routes, replacing the current semi-automated approach. It will consist of four key components:
On November 6, during the “Creating the Future” symposium, Norilsk Nickel Vice President Nikolay Utkin revealed plans to nearly double the company’s annual cargo transportation along the Northern Sea Route from 1.6 million tons to 3 million tons by 2028-2030.
Utkin highlighted the company’s resources, including a fleet of six ice-class vessels, its subsidiary Yenisei River Shipping Company, which is the main cargo carrier on the Yenisei River, and its port facilities in Dudinka capable of accommodating both sea and river vessels. Norilsk Nickel intends to continue investing in the development of transport infrastructure in the regions where it operates.
Deputy Prime Minister and Presidential Envoy to the Far Eastern Federal District Yuri Trutnev reported that Russia’s current satellite resources are inadequate for providing complete and up-to-date information about ice conditions on the NSR. The country relies on 11 satellites to monitor ice and hydrometeorological conditions, but their number, survey frequency, and capabilities fall short of delivering comprehensive data.
On November 6, Rosatom announced the launch of the nuclear icebreaker Chukotka at the Baltic Shipyard in St. Petersburg. This vessel is the fifth in the Project 22220 series (and the fourth serial icebreaker) built by the Baltic Shipyard for Rosatom.
The universal nuclear icebreakers in this series are the largest and most powerful in the world, designed for year-round navigation in the western Arctic. They are capable of towing ships and floating structures through ice and open water.
Currently, the Arktika, Sibir, and Ural, also part of the Project 22220 series, are operating in NSR waters. The commissioning of the icebreaker Yakutia, launched in November 2022, is scheduled for the end of 2024.
The Russian shipyard Zvezda is nearing the completion of its first Arc7 ice-class gas carriers for the Arctic LNG 2 project, though delays persist. According to Kommersant, the delivery of the lead tanker, Alexey Kosygin, to NOVATEK has been postponed to early 2025. Another tanker, Pyotr Stolypin, is now expected in the first quarter of 2025. To expedite construction, the workforce at the shipyard has been increased from 200 to 500 employees.
The third tanker, Sergey Vitte, might be delivered by the end of 2025, though timelines for subsequent tankers remain unclear.
Experts suggest that NOVATEK may need Arc7 tankers this winter, but their necessity will depend on whether the company can secure buyers for Arctic LNG 2 cargoes, which are subject to U.S. sanctions. As reported in October digest, despite Arctic LNG 2 shipping eight batches of products since August, no buyers have been confirmed.
On November 22, the Russian Maritime Collegium convened the first meeting of the Council for the Protection of National Interests in the Arctic. The Council was established to devise strategies for state maritime policy in the Arctic.
Discussions focused on national security, the international situation, and the socio-economic development of Russia’s Arctic Zone. Presidential aide Nikolai Patrushev and Deputy Prime Minister Yuri Trutnev stressed that accelerating the region’s economic and infrastructural development is a central priority of Russia’s national maritime policy.
The first meeting of the Subcommission on Cooperation on the Northern Sea Route between Russia and China took place in St. Petersburg. Rosatom Director General Alexey Likhachev and Chinese Minister of Transport Liu Wei participated in the discussions. The agenda included key areas of collaboration such as ensuring navigation safety, planning and increasing cargo traffic along the NSR, developing logistics routes, and exchanging information on ice, meteorological, and other conditions.
During the 2024 navigation season, Chinese shipping companies nearly doubled the number of voyages along the NSR. The port of Arkhangelsk received five container ships from China, delivering over 33,000 tons of various goods, primarily auto parts.In return, approximately 40,000 tons of export products were shipped from Arkhangelsk to Chinese ports. These exports included lumber, paper, cardboard, and pulp.
«Since the start of the war in Ukraine, Russia has significantly increased its activities in the Arctic, with a primary focus on developing the Northern Sea Route. Bellona has consistently documented and shared insights on the political, legislative, financial, organizational, and technological decisions made by Russia, as well as practical steps taken regarding the Arctic. The Arctic’s importance for Russia stems from several factors, including its geographical location, national security, natural resources, and transport potential.
As a result, significant political decisions have been made, such as establishing the Council for the Protection of National Interests in the Arctic, revitalizing the Marine Board, transferring key Arctic responsibilities to Rosatom—a stable and politically aligned entity—and other measures introduced in recent years. However, the grand ambitions outlined by the Russian leadership face numerous challenges.
One major challenge is the NSR’s cargo flow. The development strategy aims to increase cargo traffic from the current 37.6 million tons annually to 150 million tons by 2030—a nearly fourfold increase within six years. This target appears ambitious, as it depends not only on Russian efforts but also on international transportation, which is influenced by a range of geopolitical, economic, and climatic factors.
Russia’s current icebreaker fleet is also a limiting factor. Atomflot operates only seven nuclear icebreakers, while the country has an additional 35 diesel-electric icebreakers, most of which are limited to operations in coastal zones of the Kara Sea and Arctic rivers. With the exception of the Viktor Chernomyrdin (built in 2020), these vessels are insufficient for the broader goals of the NSR. The strategy states that eight nuclear and four diesel icebreakers are necessary for full NSR escort operations, yet the demand for more powerful icebreakers is only part of the equation.
Equally crucial is the development of the NSR’s supporting infrastructure, including coastal and marine facilities, space complexes, and digital platforms. These essential components currently exist only as plans. The costs and logistics of building this infrastructure under the constraints of a “military economy” make its completion uncertain.
Given these challenges, there is a high likelihood that the ambitious plans of Norilsk Nickel, NOVATEK, Rosatom, and other key stakeholders may remain unrealized, confined to paper rather than becoming a reality.»
Aleksander Nikitin
Nuclear advisor
In October digest, we wrote that NOVATEK’s Arctic LNG 2 project had reduced gas production at its field to 5.3 million cubic meters per day, with minimal processing maintained for technological reasons.
According to Bloomberg, gas production at Arctic LNG 2 dropped even further in early November, reaching its lowest level in over a year. From November 1 to 10, the project produced just 0.4 million cubic meters of gas per day—less than during the commissioning of its first production train in late 2023, when output ranged between 2 and 14 million cubic meters per day.
Bloomberg has reported that sanctions have effectively brought operations at NOVATEK’s Belokamenka facility in the Murmansk Region to a near standstill. This plant, responsible for producing liquefied natural gas modules, assembled the first two production lines for the Arctic LNG 2 project. Satellite imagery shows that the plant’s third line remains only partially completed.
Further analysis by the Payne Institute for Public Policy, an Earth observation group in Colorado, revealed that nighttime light intensity at the Belokamenka plant in late October and early November was the lowest recorded since 2019—nearly zero—indicating minimal activity at the site.
On November 25, the British government released an updated sanctions list that included 30 tankers transporting Russian oil under the flags of Russia, Panama, Gabon, and several other countries. With this update, the total number of sanctioned oil tankers exceeded 80.
Following the announcement, on November 29, the Panama Maritime Authority stated that it had expedited the cancellation of licenses for six vessels flagged under Panama in response to the British sanctions.
On October 31, the Japanese shipping company Mitsui OSK Lines reported that tightening sanctions might prevent it from delivering gas carriers for the Arctic LNG 2 project. Potential issues include complications with charter agreements for three icebreaking LNG carriers and one icebreaker for condensate transport, which were contracted with Mitsui OSK Lines between 2020 and early 2022.
The Arctida portal, in collaboration with the Italian analytical newspaper Domani, published an investigation revealing how Italian and international companies have bypassed sanctions. The report indicates that since April 9, 2022—when sanctions on LNG equipment supplies came into effect—the Arctic LNG 2 project has received components worth €134 million from approximately a dozen Italian companies.
Nuovo Pignone emerged as the primary supplier, along with companies such as Tenaris, Marcegaglia, Prysmian, Cortem, Honeywell, Erresse, and others. In most instances, these deliveries were facilitated through intermediary firms registered in China, the UAE, and Turkey.
According to ship tracking data compiled by Bloomberg, French imports of LNG from Russia reached a record high of over 5.3 million tons in 10 months of 2024, compared to 3.37 million tons in 2023 and 5.28 million tons in 2022. This marks the highest volume since France began importing Russian LNG in 2018.
A significant portion of the imports was processed at the Dunkirk terminal near the Belgian border. The facility is managed by Securing Energy for Europe GmbH, a German company formerly part of Gazprom PJSC, which was nationalized by Germany following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
French energy giant TotalEnergies SE, along with Spain’s Naturgy Energy Group SA, continues to import Russian LNG under long-term contracts signed before the onset of the war.
«As in the previous month, there have been no significant shifts in the international dynamics surrounding the Russian Arctic. The EU and certain national government bodies continue to tolerate LNG deliveries from the Yamal plant to France and Spain. Energy companies in these countries prefer to continue purchaes according to long-term contracts, demonstrating that almost three years of war have not led Western companies to voluntarily abandon established business arrangements. These agreements are considered more convenient, cost-effective (aside from reputational risks), and there are no guarantees that they will not be sanctioned for violating long-term contracts.
Moreover, Western companies tend to overlook the ultimate Russian recipients of goods, allowing them to circumvent international sanctions. For instance, a recent Italian investigative report revealed that in 2023, Italian companies supplied components for the sanctioned Arctic LNG-2 project through intermediary firms in third countries. While it may be impractical for companies to thoroughly vet all buyers for ties to sanctioned Russian entities, the end recipient of goods ordered for a specific enterprise in Russia is often apparent, despite the use of intermediaries in offshore jurisdictions.
The addition of oil tankers to the EU sanctions list continues to resemble a game of cat and mouse. Russia steadily expands its “shadow fleet” of tankers, using various methods to conceal them, while Western nations and Ukraine attempt to locate and sanction these vessels. This reactive strategy not only leaves openings for Russia to continue its oil trade but also heightens the risk of oil spill incidents.
Efforts by EU countries to ban the passage of Russian shadow fleet tankers through European straits and coastal waters could push Russia to redirect more oil shipments along the Northern Sea Route (NSR) to Asia in the upcoming navigation season. This shift would significantly increase the likelihood of an environmental disaster in the Arctic, a region particularly vulnerable to oil spills and pollution.
A reduction in global oil demand is the only measure that could simultaneously lower environmental risks in the Arctic and reduce Russia’s oil revenue.»
Ksenia Vakhrusheva
Project Manager, Arctic project advisor
The Lovozero Mining and Processing Plant, a subsidiary of Rosatom, has initiated the design of new workings at the Karnasurt mine in the Lovozero District of the Murmansk Region. Mining operations are set to begin in 2025, with loparite ore extraction—used for producing rare and rare earth metals—planned for 2026.
According to plant’s General Director Vladimir Fedyakov, geological estimates indicate that the new site contains 5.2 million tons of ore. More than 20 new stope blocks will be developed on the mine’s southwestern flank. Simultaneously, plans are being made to establish over 40 km of new underground workings as part of the development of additional underground horizons at Karnasurt. This phase of the project is scheduled to commence in 2032.
On November 9, the Kremlin published a list of presidential directives following a review of Far East development initiatives. Among the key tasks is the preparation of proposals, due by February 15, to lower the cost of bank loans for investment projects in the Arctic and the Far Eastern Federal District.
The measures will include initiatives to support development in these regions, such as exploring the feasibility of issuing specialized bonds to finance Arctic and Far Eastern projects. This approach aims to facilitate investment and accelerate regional economic growth.
On November 11, a presidential decree published on the official legal information portal granted Surgutneftegaz, NOVATEK, and its subsidiaries, including Arctic LNG 2 and Yamal LNG, the authority to independently determine the scope and content of corporate information they disclose. This decree continues an initiative launched in November 2023, which granted similar rights to companies such as Rosneft, Bashneft, Slavneft, and others.
On November 21, Norilsk Nickel announced an agreement with Gazprom Neft to enhance gas production efficiency at 11 of the 62 active wells at the Severo-Soleninskoye gas condensate field.
The project aims to increase daily gas output from these wells from 215,000 m³ to 530,000 m³. This gas is used to power Norilsk Nickel’s production facilities and supply the city of Norilsk.
If the collaboration proves successful, the companies plan to expand their partnership to include other initiatives focused on improving production efficiency and undertaking joint projects.
On November 29, the President of Russia signed a law introducing a zero mineral extraction tax rate for natural gas and gas condensate production from the Achimov and Jurassic deposits on the Yamal Peninsula. This tax benefit will take effect on January 1, 2028.
The zero tax rate will remain in place for 10 years, until the end of 2037, or until cumulative production across all relevant subsoil areas reaches 130 billion cubic meters of gas and 15 million tons of condensate, whichever comes first.
Currently, Yamal LNG, owned by NOVATEK, is the only liquefied natural gas plant operating in the region. It is actively developing the Jurassic deposits at the South Tambeyskoye field.
Additionally, the new legislation includes an increase in the corporate profit tax for Transneft from 20% to 40%. This elevated tax rate will apply from 2025 to 2030. According to Deputy Finance Minister Alexey Sazanov, the higher rate is expected to generate an additional 20–40 billion rubles in budget revenues annually.
On November 12, Bloomberg reported that Norilsk Nickel is negotiating the construction of a copper smelter on China’s southern coast. The proposed facility, located in the port city of Fangchenggang in Guangxi province, would produce 500,000 tons of refined copper annually using concentrate supplied from Russia.
Previously, Norilsk Nickel explored partnerships with at least two Chinese companies to use their existing smelting facilities for processing Russian concentrate. However, these negotiations did not lead to an agreement. The company is now considering building a new plant, though a final decision has yet to be made.
According to Bloomberg, the plan faces opposition from Chinese copper producers. The city of Fangchenggang is already home to a major copper smelter with a capacity of 600,000 tons, operated by the state-owned Jinchuan Group, which could complicate Norilsk Nickel’s efforts to establish its own facility.
«Preliminary results for the year indicate that the intensification of mineral resource development in the Arctic is progressing more slowly than outlined in various government strategies. Many enterprises initially slated for launch in 2024 have been delayed until 2025 or postponed indefinitely.
Notable examples include the Arctic LNG 2 project, which was launched but subsequently came to a near halt; the Syradasay coal deposit; and the copper-nickel ores of the Chernogorsk deposit, all now rescheduled for 2025. The timelines for the development of the Pavlovskoye deposit on Novaya Zemlya, the Vostok Oil production project, and the Obskiy natural gas liquefaction project remain uncertain.
The delays highlight the impact of international sanctions, which have created challenges in sourcing equipment for production and processing, imposed direct restrictions (as in the cases of Arctic LNG 2, Vostok Oil, and Obskiy plant), and complicated the search for buyers. In response, the Russian government continues to expand incentives for investors in Arctic projects. These benefits are intended to attract private capital for developing local infrastructure, such as logistics hubs, transportation routes, and energy systems. They are also aimed at increasing traffic on the Northern Sea Route, demonstrating its utility and development potential to international partners, particularly China.
However, despite frequent media reports about new companies entering the Arctic for exploration and extraction, the pace of project implementation remains sluggish. This slow progress is hampering both industrial production growth and the expansion of goods transport along the NSR. This trend is likely to persist into the next year as the effects of international sanctions continue to impact Russian businesses.
Regrettably, the slowdown in Arctic industrial growth does not necessarily translate into reduced environmental risks. Alongside new economic incentives for Arctic residents, the state is also weakening environmental oversight and encouraging opacity in corporate reporting, further exacerbating ecological concerns.»
Ksenia Vakhrusheva
Project Manager, Arctic project advisor
On November 18, the Pechora Environmental Prosecutor’s Office reported several violations of environmental protection and industrial safety regulations at four oil-producing enterprises in the Komi region.
An audit revealed that three companies had failed to develop legally required oil and oil product spill prevention and response plans. Additionally, a fourth company neglected to properly monitor its mothballed wells.
In response, the prosecutor’s office issued directives to the management of these enterprises, demanding they address the identified violations. Furthermore, administrative cases were initiated against three companies under Part 1 of Article 8.50 of the Code of Administrative Offenses of the Russian Federation for failing to meet requirements related to the prevention and cleanup of oil spills.
On November 21, members of the Arctic Floating University expedition shared initial findings on giant viruses discovered on the islands of the Arctic Ocean. These Arctic viruses were found to be significantly larger than their counterparts in temperate regions.
For instance, while the diameter of the influenza virus typically ranges from 80 to 120 nanometers, a virus unearthed in the permafrost of Yakutia measures up to 1,500 nanometers in length—large enough to be observed with a standard light microscope.
Scientists are still uncertain about how these viruses evolve and what potential risks they might pose to humans.
The Russian Geographical Society has reported that Mesyatsev Island, located in the Franz Josef Land archipelago, has sunk beneath the water. In 2015, the island’s area was approximately 53 hectares. Monitoring revealed that the island, composed of ice and silt deposits, melted due to global warming, with the remaining portions eroded by waves.
Arkady Tishkov, chief researcher at the Institute of Geography of the Russian Academy of Sciences, explained in an interview with RBC that the formation and disappearance of landmasses in the Russian Arctic is influenced not only by climate change but also by tectonic uplift, which varies in intensity across the region.
On November 25, the P.P. Shirshov Institute of Oceanology reported significant air pollution in the Northwestern regions of Russia. The study found elevated levels of trace elements in winter precipitation, which also affect the chemical composition of river waters in the region.
During winter, the highest levels of air pollution from insoluble particles were recorded in Severodvinsk and Onega in the Arkhangelsk Region. In Onega, snow is contaminated with magnesium, rubidium, strontium, cesium, barium, and lead, primarily from emissions from coal-fired boilers. In Severodvinsk, snow contains vanadium, nickel, aluminum, copper, strontium, and lead.
Since October 30, the tanker Ammolite, carrying 4,000 tons of oil products, has been waiting for help for 12 days in Ugolnaya Bay, Chukotka, after fishing nets became tangled around its propeller during a storm. The situation was worsened by frosts reaching minus 32 degrees Celsius. The icebreaker rescue ship Spravedlivy, which was expected to assist, did not arrive as it was busy helping other vessels.
On November 5, the Yamalo-Nenets District Court ordered the removal of two decommissioned ships that have been polluting the soil and waters of the Poluy River near Salekhard with oil products. These ships have remained there since 2006.
The fuel oil spill in Kola Bay, which, according to preliminary data, occurred on August 11 during the loading of bunker fuel onto a ship, still had not been cleaned up as of November. A ship capsized in the Barents Sea, leaving a fuel trail several tens of meters long.
In our October digest, we reported that a barge carrying fuel and a power plant for the village of Gyda became stuck in the ice in the Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug. A subsequent inspection by the prosecutor’s office found that the stranded dry cargo ship ST-798 was operating in violation of regulations. The ship lacked classification and inspection documents, a measurement certificate, and certificates for preventing environmental pollution. An administrative case was initiated for violating technical regulations, and a formal warning was issued to the management of OOO “REDOX.”
An incident involving Volgoneft oil tankers occurred in the Kerch Strait. Although this event took place outside the Arctic zone, it clearly illustrates the risks of operating old vessels in challenging weather conditions, where economic and military objectives often take precedence over lives of crew and environmental safety. Read more about these incidents and the risks of similar accidents in the Russian Arctic in our article.
An accident aboard numerous Volgoneft oil tankers in the Kerch in mid December clearly show what can happen to aged ships when they are operated in bad weather—and when economic and military objectives are prioritized over the lives of crews and environmental safety.
In this news digest, we monitor events that impact the environment in the Russian Arctic. Our focus lies in identifying the factors that contribute to pollution and climate change.
A survey of events in the field of nuclear and radiation safety relating to Russia and Ukraine.
A visit last week by Vladimir Putin and a Kremlin entourage to Astana, Kazakhstan sought in part to put Rosatom, Russia’s state nuclear corporation, on good footing with local officials.